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ABSTRACT 
 
The State of California has made great strides in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions through mandated, rate-payer funded Investor Owned Utility (IOU) electricity 
Demand Side Management (DSM) programs. This study quantifies the amount of 
reduced GHG emissions in Arizona that result from DSM in that state, as well as the 
DSM reductions within Southern California Edison (SCE), Pacific Gas and Electric 
(PG&E), and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) during the 2010 through 2012 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) DSM program cycle. To accomplish this 
quantification, it develops a model to allocated GHG emissions based on “operating 
margin” resources requirements specific to each utility in order to effectively track, 
monitor, and quantify avoided emissions from grid-based utility resources. The 
developed model estimates that during the 2010-2012 program cycle, 5,327.12 metric 
tons (MT) of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) in GHG reductions (or 1.8 percent of 
total reductions) can be attributed to reduced demand from Arizona--based resources by 
California IOUs.  By focusing on the spatial context of GHG emission reductions, this 
study models and quantifies the spill-over effect of California’s regulatory environment 
into neighboring states.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW  
The role of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions in global climate change, 
particularly those resulting from the combustion of fossil fuels for the purpose of 
electricity generation, has been well documented (IPCC 2001). Owing to a number of 
factors, the State of California has long been considered a leader in efforts to mitigate 
anthropogenic impacts on the environment.  Within the last decade, this sensitivity has 
been channeled toward developing policies designed to reduce GHG emissions through 
market based mechanisms. Prior, and concurrent, to the passage of AB32, California 
regulators have adopted policies indirectly designed to reduce GHG emissions through 
the more efficient use of electric energy, particularly through energy conservation and 
demand side management (DSM) activities. As electricity imports from neighboring 
states significantly increased following California electric utility restructuring in the late 
1990s, and the ensuing electricity crises in 2000, California regulators placed an 
increased emphasis on DSM as a mechanism both as a way to manage load growth and to 
reduce dependence on electricity imports (Sweeney 2002).  
Since the 1970s, utilities in California have promoted energy conservation 
through consumer education and direct financial incentives as a mechanism to control 
load growth.  A recently added benefit of utility DSM activities is that they tie into the 
state’s over-arching focus on GHG emission reductions.  During the 2010 through 2012 
Program Cycle, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) authorized the state’s 
three electric Investor Owned Utilities  Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), Southern 
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California Edison (SCE), and  San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E), to invest over $3.1 
billion in rate-payer funds toward electricity and natural gas DSM programs. For these 
three years alone, this investment is expected to translate to over 3,800 gigawatt-hours 
(GWh) of saved electricity (CPUC 2013), and, by the estimates provided in the results of 
study, over 296,000 metric tons of “carbon dioxide equivalents” (CO2e) in avoided 
emissions.  Carbon dioxide equivalents is used to describe an aggregate total of all 
greenhouse gas emissions according to their respective 100-year global warming 
potentials (GWP) compared to an equal weight of carbon dioxide are carbon dioxide 
(CO2). For instance, methane (CH4) has a GWP 25 times more than CO2. Similarly, 
nitrous oxide (N2O) has a GWP 298 times more GWP than CO2. 
1
   
However, given the state’s reliance in electricity imports from areas throughout 
the Western United States, it only stands to reason that some of such reduced GHG 
emissions can be attributed to lower demand for electric generators located in states from 
which it imports electricity, particularly Arizona.  Though many entities, such as the 
California Climate Action Reserve (CCAR), the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB), as well as the California Energy Commission (CEC),  have all been actively 
involved in developing GHG emission factors, inventories, and calculators specific to 
California utilities since the late 1990s, these organizations have not adequately 
developed a methodology to assess the “spill-over effect” of avoided emissions in 
neighboring states as a result of California utility demand side management activities. 
                                                          
1
 For additional GWP information, please reference; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Working Group 1 (WG1), Chapter 2, 
Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing, Table 2.14, page 212 
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Indeed, the current course of academic inquiry regarding utility DSM has been generally 
limited to basic assessments of avoided emissions specific to one geographical region 
(Hall et al. 1995), the cost-effectiveness of DSM programs (Loughran and Kulick 2004), 
or broad life-cycle assessments (Weisser 2007). 
 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study is to quantify the reduction of CO2e that are attributed 
to lowered demand from Arizona-based resources by California IOUs as a result of their 
DSM activity during the 2010 through 2012 DSM program cycle. Through this analysis, 
the study hopes to shed light on the spill-over effect of environmental regulation between 
grid-connected states, as well as serve as a foundation for future academic inquiry into 
effective strategies to track, monitor, and model avoided emissions from grid-based 
utility resources.   
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 This study answers the research question: What quantity of CO2e are attributed 
to lowered demand from Arizona-based resources by California IOUs as a result of their 
DSM activity during the 2010 through 2012 DSM program cycle?  
 
STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 This study has five distinct sections. The first section provides historical context 
and background information regarding the structure and nature of California’s electric 
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system, with the purpose of identifying major pieces of recent federal and state 
legislation, including electric industry restructuring and  demand side management 
policies which had significant impacts on the recent development of  California’s electric 
system.   The second section briefly describes the evolution of GHG emissions 
assessments specific to California, including GHG emission factors developed by the 
California Climate Action Reserve (CCAR), inventory and reporting tools developed by 
CARB, as well as the GHG calculator developed by the CEC and in use by PG&E, SCE, 
and SDGE.  Next, the study describes the methodology outlined in the United Nations 
Framework for Climate Change (UN FCC), adopted by the World Resources Institute 
(WRI) for carbon offset projects, and subsequently modified for use in assessing avoided 
emissions resulting from demand side management on a utility grid network.  Last, the 
study present the results of this assessment; describe the relative strengths, weaknesses, 
and difficulties of this approach; as well as suggestions for further research aimed at 
improving the accuracy of the model and expanding the spatial context of this analysis.  
Figure 1 illustrates the methodological framework employed in this study: 
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Figure 1:  
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CHAPTER 2: THE CALIFORNIA ELECTIC SYSTEM 
BACKGROUND 
Despite a large installed base of domestic generation capacity, California utilities 
have increasingly relied on electricity imports to meet their consumer demand, primarily 
from hydroelectric generators located in the Pacific Northwest and coal and nuclear 
generators in Arizona, Utah, and New Mexico. The passage of the Electric Utility 
Industry Restructuring Act (Assembly Bill 1890 or AB 1890) by the California 
legislature in 1996 directly and indirectly promoted increases in electricity imports from 
neighboring states (Blumstein et al. 2002).  Assembly Bill 1890 required the state’s 
IOU’s to divest their generating and transmission assets and allow other power marketers 
access to their distribution system (AB 1890). What ensued was a major boom in 
wholesale merchant power plant construction across the border in neighboring Arizona, 
where environmental permitting requirements remained relatively simple and existing 
electric transmission lines were able to quickly meet the needs of additional generators.  
Despite an abundant supply of renewable energy resources, as well as access to natural 
gas, the California electric system seems to have abruptly migrated into Arizona and 
other neighboring states.  The following section provides a brief overview of the 
evolution of California electric energy system culminating in the passage of AB 1890, the 
ensuing growth of wholesale merchant generation in Arizona is designed primarily to 
meet the needs of California utilities, and the current focus on DSM management as a 
way to meet future resource needs.  
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HISTORICAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Throughout the late-1800s, hydroelectric generators were constructed to provide 
reliable and inexpensive power to small, but burgeoning communities in California 
(Williams 1997).  These small hydroelectric generators paved the way for the 
construction of much larger generators throughout the state, mainly the east side of the 
state’s Sierra Nevada and Southern Cascade Mountain ranges (Hubbard 2006).  The 
availability of water, gently sloping rivers, and large drainage basins, as well as their 
proximity to growing population centers, agricultural areas, and timber operations 
provided steady demand for these hydroelectric generators. Dams were soon constructed 
in several areas of the state to store winter precipitation and thus provide reliable year-
round generation. Hydroelectric generators provided almost all of California’s electric 
generation needs for the first half of the twentieth century up until World War II (CEC 
2012a). Much of the state’s remaining hydroelectric generators provide base-load or 
intermittent power depending on the availability of adequate precipitation to replenish 
associated reservoirs.   
Industrial expansion during World War II promoted the construction of several, 
large oil-fired generators along the coast near Los Angeles and San Francisco to 
supplement existing hydroelectric generation.  Given the proximity of these generators to 
major waterways, ocean-going tankers were easily able to supplement domestic oil 
supplies to ensure that the state’s utilities could provide reliable electricity even during 
dry seasons, when hydroelectric generators often failed to meet demand. Additionally, 
their proximity to the coast meant that seawater could be used for cooling and their 
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proximity to major urban areas.  Despite these advantages, the era of oil-fired generation 
was short-lived. Stringent air quality rules in the 1970s led to the conversion of nearly all 
of these oil-fired boilers to natural gas-fired facilities. One small oil-fired power plant 
remains in operation in the San Francisco area, though this plant is expected to cease 
operations in the near future (CEPA 2006). 
Significant technological advances in the 1960s fostered the growth of two very 
large commercial grade nuclear power plants, which were subsequently expanded 
through the 1980s. Initial construction of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 
(SONGS) located in the northwestern corner of San Diego County along the Pacific coast 
began in 1968 with additional units added in 1983 and 1984 (Los Angeles Times 2012a).  
The facility is jointly operated by SCE (78.2 percent ownership), SDG&E (20 percent), 
the City of Riverside California Utilities Department (1.8%), and has a rated capacity of 
about 2,200 megawatts (MW) though the plant has been shut down following the 
accidental release of radioactive steam in January 2012 (Los Angeles Times 2012b). 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company constructed a 2,200 MW nuclear generation facility 
near San Luis Obispo County in 1968. Diablo Canyon, as it is called, has also raised 
public fears of safety issues when a major geologic fault was discovered beneath the plant 
(NRC 2011).  When combined, SONGS and Diablo Canyon generate roughly the same 
amount of electricity as all of the state’s hydroelectric generators combined (36,666 GWh 
in 2011) (CEC 2012a).  The California legislature passed a moratorium on the 
construction of new nuclear generation facilities in 1976, new nuclear generators in the 
state are unlikely (Wellock 1998). 
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Coal generated electricity currently comprises only two percent of in-state 
generation (3,120 GWh in 2011) (CEC 2012a). In place of coal, the state has been 
aggressively promoting the development of renewable energy resources.  California 
Senate Bill 1078, passed in 2002, and subsequently modified in 2006 (Senate Bill 107 
and 2011 (Senate Bill 2) requires investor and publically owned utilities in the state to 
increase procurement of electricity from renewable energy resources to 33 percent of 
total resource use by 2020 (CPUC 2012a). Despite drastic increases in renewable 
electricity consumption as a percent of total sales PG&E (19 percent), SCE (20.6 
percent), and SDG&E (20.3 percent) has increased, in-state generators only account for a 
small percentage of total installed capacity.  Renewable energy resources account for 
only eleven percent of the state’s total installed generation capacity (Solar – 1,058 GWh, 
Wind – 7,594 GWh in 2011, Biomass – 5,777 GWh (CEC 2012a). The remaining balance 
of renewable electric generation is imported from neighboring states.  
Despite future projected growth in renewable electricity energy supply, natural 
gas-fired combustion turbine and combined-cycle facilities comprise the vast majority of 
the state’s installed base of electric generators. Advances in the efficiency of combined-
cycle technology, increased and cheaper supplies, stringent air quality regulations, and 
ease of operations and maintenance all contributed the rapid growth in natural gas-fired 
generators during the state’s electricity restructuring in the late 1990s.   Prior to 
electricity restructuring, between 1978 and 1998, the California Energy Commission 
(CEC), which is the agency responsible for licensing thermal power plants greater than 
50 MW, approved forty-seven total natural-gas fired electricity production projects with 
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an installed capacity of 5,589 MW (CEC 2012a).  Following the enactment of AB 1890 
the CEC approved sixty-six electricity generation projects with an installed capacity of 
25,789 MW (CEC 2012a).  Thirty-nine of these natural gas generators with an installed 
capacity of 13,180 MW had been ultimately constructed by 2008, nearly doubling the 
total installed capacity of generation from all sources of electricity from previous decades 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2:  
 
California Installed Capacity Additions by Fuel Type and Decade (1890-2010) (MW)  
 
 
Source: CEC QFER Database 2012 
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capacity of in-state generation is much lower at 58,458 MW (CEC 2012a, CAISO 2011). 
Net dependable capacity (NDC) refers to the maximum capacity at which a generator can 
be depended upon to supply dispatchable load based on seasonal limitations (particularly 
for hydroelectric generators dependent upon rainfall), forced outages, and operation and 
maintenance requirements, and required reserve margin requirements (CAISO 2011). 
California utilities distribute approximately 285,000 GWh of electricity annually.  
Approximately 33 percent (94,000 GWh) of this electricity is distributed by publically 
owned utility (POU) customers, the largest of which are Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power (LADWP) and Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD). 
Investor owned utility electricity distribution is nearly double that of POU distribution. 
Combined, customers from the state’s three major IOUs, PG&E (85,000 GWh), SCE 
(84,000 GWh), and SDG&E (17,500 GWh) account for nearly all (98 percent) of the total 
electricity consumed in the state annually (186,000 GWh) (CEC 2012b). Almost 30 
percent of this electricity must be imported from generators located in neighboring states 
in the Pacific Northwest (10 percent- 27,718 GWh) and Desert Southwest (20 percent - 
56,821 GWh) (CEC 2012a).
 2
   
  
                                                          
2
 The California Energy Commission’s definition of the Pacific Northwest includes the 
states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming, as well as 
the Canadian provinces of Alberta and British Columbia; whereas the Desert Southwest 
refers to the states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and the western-
most part of the Texas pan-handle.  
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ELECTRICITY IMPORTS 
Since the construction of the Bonneville (1937), Hoover (1935), Grand Coulee 
(1942), and Glen Canyon (1963) dams, California has relied on electricity imports to 
meet its consumption needs (Williams 1997).  The California-Oregon AC-Intertie, Pacific 
DC Intertie, Intermountain DC Tie, and several Desert Southwest (Arizona/Colorado and 
Arizona) high voltage transmission intertie projects in the 1970s allowed electricity 
generated from newly constructed coal and nuclear generation facilities to supply 
California consumers.  Several California utilities took advantage of these new high 
capacity lines by either directly financing or, later purchasing utility generators located 
throughout Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and Utah (see Table 1).  Nearly all of these 
generators continue to supply electric power to California consumers except for the coal-
fired, 1,580 MW Mohave Generating Station (MGS) in Nevada, owned by SCE (56 
percent) and LADWP (10 percent). Mohave was retired in 2005 due to the costs 
associated with the installation of new pollution control equipment, as well as the 
inability of SCE to negotiate water rights to operate the coal slurry line which transported 
fuel to the facility (SCE 2012). Following the passage of AB 1890, electricity imports 
significantly increased primarily from wholesale natural-gas fired merchant generators in 
the Desert Southwest.  
13 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
California Utility Ownership in Out-of State Electricity Generating Facilities (2012) 
 
 
 
Source: California Energy Commission California Utility Ownership in Out of State 
Generation (CEC 2012c) 
 
ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING  
 Prior to AB1890 California’s electric system operated in a simple, predictable 
manner based on the pretext of efficiency through economies of scale.  Each of the state’s 
IOUs were granted exclusive franchise rights by the CPUC to serve all retail customers 
within a designated geographical service territory in exchange for government oversight 
of the rates, finances, and quality of service. As in other areas of the county, these IOUs 
operated as vertically integrated monopolies, directly financing, constructing, and 
operating vast generation, transmission and distribution networks.    The role of the 
Plant Name Fuel- Type
Operating 
Company
Comissioning  
Date
Total 
Nameplate 
Capacity
Generating 
Unit
Installed Unit-
Level Capacity
California 
Ownership
Percent Owned 
By California 
Utility 
Capacity 
Owned by 
California Utiity
1969 4 818.1
Southern California 
Edison 
48% 393
1970 5 818.1
Southern California 
Edison 
48 393
3 555 City of Azusa 6.15% 34
3 555 City of Colton 6.15% 34
3 555 City of Glendale 4.10% 23
3 555 City of Banning 4.10% 23
3 555
Imperial Irrigation 
District
21.30% 118
4 555 City of Anaheim 10.04% 56
4 555
MSR Public Power 
Agency
28.71% 159
1974 NAV1 803.1
Los Angeles Dept 
Water & Power
21.20% 170
1975 NAV2 803.1
Los Angeles Dept 
Water & Power
21.20% 170
1976 NAV3 803.1
Los Angeles Dept 
Water & Power
21.20% 170
Reid Gardner 
Generating 
Plant, Nevada
Coal
Nevada 
Power 
Company
1983 612 MW 4 270
California Dept of 
Water Resources
67.80% 183
1 900
Intermountain 
Power Agency
96% 787
2 855
Intermountain 
Power Agency
96% 787
Unit 1 1,311
Unit 2 1,314
Unit 3 1,312
1973 (Unit 3 & 
4 purchased 
by Southern 
California 
Public Power 
Authority 
(SCPPA) in 
1993)
1986
1988
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Nuclear
Intermountain 
Power Plant, 
Utah
Los Angeles 
Department of 
Water and 
Power
1,640 MW
Palo Verde 
Nuclear 
Generating 
Station, Arizona
Arizona 
Public 
Service 
Company
3,937 MW
Southern California Edison (15.8%)                  
Southern California Public Power Authority (5.9%)           
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (5.7%)
Four Corners 
Power Plant, 
New Mexico
Arizona 
Public 
Service 
Company
2,070 MW
San Juan 
Generating 
Station, New 
Mexico
Public 
Service 
Company of 
New Mexico
1,848 MW
Navajo 
Generating 
Station, Arizona
Salt River 
Project 
2,409 MW
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CPUC was to ensure public oversight of these IOUs on par with other municipal POUs, 
which were regulated by their own respective municipal boards,
3
  to ensure that 
consumers were being charged fair market rates for electric consumption.  The CPUC 
used an administrative law process, known as a “rate case” to balance consumer interest 
(service quality, pricing, service access, and environmental considerations) with the 
ability of the utility to earn a fair profit for their investors (Phillips 1993).   
  During rate cases, utilities would generally propose rates and underlying 
assumptions regarding operating costs. In turn, the CPUC would accept, reject, or ask the 
utility to modify the proposed rates based on their own understanding of a fair rate of 
return on capital for private investment needed to finance the construction of a wide 
range of power plant, transmission, and distribution projects.  Even though rate cases 
made IOUs beholden to public oversight, they served as a reliable funding mechanism to 
increase generating capacity while almost guaranteeing a return on investment for utility 
investors (Joskow 1989).  This system worked well through the 1960s. In California, like 
many other states the CPUC worked with utility companies to activity promote the 
expansion of electricity throughout the state. With regulatory support, PG&E, SCE, and 
SDG&E were able to rapidly finance, site, and construct several hundred electric 
generators and thousands of miles of transmission lines, including associated substations 
and switchyards (Eto 1996).  Utilities flourished as they were quickly able to achieve 
economies of scale through the construction of additional generators, advances in 
                                                          
3
 California’s other two large utilities – Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
(LADWP) and Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) – are publically owned 
utilities (POU), and, in such, are not regulated by the CPUC.  
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technology, and reducing operating costs protected from competition by their monopoly 
franchise rights.  Consumers also reaped the benefits of expanded electric service and 
steadily declining electric rates (EIA 2000). In many respects, the 1950s and 1960s were 
a “Golden Age” of public and private cooperation in California benefitting private 
industry, electric utilities, and consumers.  
Though the rapid growth and expansion of the state’s electric industry was not 
without its problems. New federal air quality regulations, dramatic increases in the price 
of oil, environmental concerns over oil and gas exploration, and the introduction of 
capital intensive generating technologies, namely nuclear power, coupled with ever-
increasing interest rates placed pressure on utilities to increase rates. After decades of 
ever-increasing growth, the once harmonious relationship between utility companies and 
state regulators had come to an end due to public concerns regarding the environmental 
consequences of energy production (Hyman 1994).  The Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 
required utilities to reduce emissions resulting from the combustion of fossil fuels (EPA 
2012).  The Arab Oil embargo of 1973-74, and the Iranian oil embargo of 1979 
dramatically increased the cost of fossil fuels.  As well, the accident at Three Mile Island 
in 1979 raised costs of constructing nuclear power plants due to new environmental 
concerns and increased scrutiny by federal regulators. These factors, combined with 
skyrocketing interest rates, placed utility companies increasingly at odds with state 
regulators as attempts to recover through the traditional rate case process became more 
and more difficult (Kahn 1988).  The CPUC, facing political pressures of its own, utilized 
the rate case process to ensure utility compliance with federal and state environmental 
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mandates, which severely hampered the construction of new power plants needed to meet 
the ever increasing demands for electricity by California consumers. 
In response to increasing tension between state regulators and utility companies in 
California (as well as other states) the U.S.  Congress passed several pieces of legislation 
designed to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign sources of energy through both demand-
side and supply- side strategies.  Among these acts were the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (1975) (EPCA), Energy Conservation and Production Act (1976) 
(ECPA), Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), and National Energy 
Conservation Policy Act (1978) (NECPA), consolidated under the umbrella National 
Energy Act (NEA)(1978), which  laid the foundations for the structure of California’s 
utility industry. The ECPA authorized the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
(SPR), extended oil price controls, mandated minimum efficiency standards for 
automobiles, and directed the establishment of minimum energy efficiency standards for 
new residential and commercial buildings, as well as the creation of incentives for energy 
conservation and state weatherization programs (ECPA 1976). Similarly, the EPCA 
directed the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop standard 
procedures for measuring the energy efficiency of common household appliances (EPCA 
1975).  These standard efficiency ratings were later codified in the National Appliance 
Energy Conservation Act 1975, amended in 1987 (NAECA 1987).  The NAECA created 
uniform federal energy efficiency standards for many common household appliances, 
including refrigerators, freezers, kitchens ranges and hoods, single room air conditioners, 
direct heating equipment, water heaters, pool heaters, central air conditioners, central heat 
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pumps, furnaces, and boilers (IEA 2000).  Energy Efficiency standards developed 
through EPCA (and later NAECA) and EPCA were later consolidated and codified into 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT), and subsequently amended by the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005.   
Whereas ECPA and EPCA focused primarily on measures designed to shaping 
consumer energy demand, the role of PURPA was to promote efficiency in utility supply 
by fostering market competition and the construction of non-utility electric generators.  
PURPA required utilities to purchase power from more efficient non-utility generators if 
the cost of that generation was less than the utility’s own “avoided cost” of constructing 
new generating capacity (PURPA 1978). The intent of this legislation was to foster 
market competition by decoupling the cost of generation from utility service for new 
power generation, while maintaining the service monopolies of existing utility 
companies. This act went so far as to require utilities to set up transmission lines to and 
purchase electricity directly from non-utility generators (known as qualifying facilities 
(QF)) even, in some cases, if the utility already had sufficient generating capacity to meet 
demand.
4
  Though the interpretation and implementation of the provisions of this act 
were generally left to individual states, the CPUC aggressively used PURPA to support 
the growth of non-utility generation in the California, and laid the foundations for later 
electric industry restructuring under AB 1890 passed almost two decades later.   
                                                          
4
 PURPA outlines a number of provisions for qualifying facilities including size and 
ownership restrictions.   
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 Though not as profound as PURPA, the NECPA was the first attempt to codify 
demand-side management as a resource option on par with the construction of new 
generation assets. This act required utilities to offer on-site energy audits, acknowledging 
that the cost of demand side management, in some cases, could prove to be lower than the 
cost of new generation. While utility companies, on one hand, fought against PURPA 
given that it threatened the existing returns on investment from the construction of new 
generating facilities, NECPA was initially viewed as more of a benign law (Eto 1996).  
The only hard requirement of NECPA was that utilities were now required to educate 
consumers regarding the potential benefits of energy conservation, though these 
programs seemed to have limited effect (Stern, Berry, and Hirst 1985). NECPA was 
preceded in California by the Warren-Alquist Energy Conservation and Development Act 
(1974), which authorized the creation of the CEC and set minimum energy efficiency 
standards for consumer appliances in California (Martin 1997, Borenstein et al. 1999, 
Joskow 1989).  
The strict enforcement of PURPA and NECPA in California, as well as the 
addition of new federal rules governing the use of natural gas and oil in new generating 
facilities, led to delays in the ability of the CPUC to oversee IOU rate case applications, 
as the agency coped with integrating federal policy into state regulations. This further 
strained relations between utilities and state regulators (Moskovitz 1989, Wiel 1989). As 
mentioned earlier, California’s strict interpretation of PURPA required utilities to 
purchase power from independent power producers.  While this led to significant growth 
in the construction of non-utility generation, many IOU generation assets remained idle 
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as supply from these assets could no longer be used to meet demand (Reid 1988). In the 
past, the cost of idle generation would have been passed onto consumers through the 
standard rate case process over an extended period of time.   Stranded utility investment 
in excess generating capacity, particularly at nuclear generating facilities, mandates to 
purchase electricity from expensive non-utility generators, and other costly 
environmental regulations forced utility companies to rapidly increase electricity rates 
through the 1980s and into the early 1990s (Joskow 2001, Sweeney 2002). The CPUC, 
however, faced pressure to resist any rate increases designed to allow utilities to recover 
the “stranded costs” of idle generation given that electric rates were steadily increasing 
along with the cost of fuel. Neither PURPA, nor the CPUC’s interpretation of PURPA, 
include provisions for utilities to recover stranded cost of idle generation capacity.  The 
solution was the development of a semi-public utility resource planning process which 
later became known as the “least cost utility planning” process (Goldman, Hirst, and 
Krause 1989). 
Though the CPUC retained the rate case process, it adopted the practices of the 
least cost utility planning process to better balance the interests of utilities and 
consumers. California, along with Washington, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Oregon were among the first states to adopt least cost 
utility planning practices (Nadel and Kushler 2000).  The least cost utility planning 
process, otherwise known as integrated resource planning, served to shift the focus of   
utility regulation from purely supply-side policies toward a balanced assessment of both 
supply and demand-side options which would provide the best economic and social 
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benefit (Cavanagh 1986, Hirst 1988, NARUC 1988). Under the traditional rate case 
process, utility companies planned, constructed, and operated power generation facilities 
without much public input, then approached the CPUC to recover the construction of 
their investment (Krause and Eto 1988).  The assumption of both the utility companies 
and utility commission was that ever increasing economies of scale and increasing 
electric consumption would always be available to cover the cost of construction (Kahn 
1991).   Through the least cost utility planning processes utilities were now forced to 
consider alternatives to new power plant construction to cost effectively meet consumer’s 
electricity needs (Cavanagh 1986).   In such, utility companies were required to develop 
alternative forecasts of future electric loads, then assess those load requirements against 
an array of pricing, generation, consumption, transmission, and distribution alternatives.  
Utilities would then present a series of alternatives to the CPUC under the rate case 
process and discuss the most appropriate combination of resources, including demand 
side management activities. These discussions resulted in a wide range of assessments 
comparing different assumptions, such as economic growth, fossil fuel prices, and 
environmental externalities (Krause and Eto 1998). Once utilities and the CPUC came to 
an agreement upon the recommended resource allocation, the CPUC would then 
authorize a rate for the utility and monitor its progress until the next rate case (Hirst 
1988). Though not perfect, the least cost utility planning process provided a forum for 
utilities to lay out the basic assumptions underlying their operations, which could 
subsequently be modified based on input from the public (Schweitzer, et al. 1991, Eto 
1996). 
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In addition to updating nearly every major piece of energy related legislation, the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) helped to promote the practice of the integrated 
resource planning process to other states.  The act also created a new class of non-utility 
generator known as “exempt wholesale generators” (EWGs). These EWGs were exempt 
from corporate or geographic restrictions and would be allowed to sell wholesale 
electricity across borders at market rates unrestricted by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC).   It amended the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUCHA) 
(1935), which regulated the interstate sale of electricity, to direct FERC to order utilities 
to provide EWGs with open access to their transmission infrastructure.  This caused 
significant problems for many utilities, which, despite the open access requirements of 
PURPA, had failed to invest enough in expanding their transmission infrastructure.  
Fearing that they would be forced to compete with EWGs, utilities dragged their feet in 
constructing new transmission and distribution lines, thus favoring their own generators 
which were located along existing transmission networks, despite the lower cost of 
electricity purchases from many non-utility generators (Eto, Soft, and Belden 1994).   
In order to rectify this situation, FERC issued Order 888 in April 1996 to compel 
utility companies to provide open transmission access at a reasonable “tariff” operated by 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)
5
, such as CAISO, as well as Order 889 
which created a wholesale electricity trading system, known as Open Access Same-time 
Information System (OASIS) for utilities to reserve and dispatch wholesale electricity 
                                                          
5
 Though Order 888 did not explicitly call for the creation of RTOs, some states, such as 
California had already moved to create ISOs. FERC passed Order 2000 in 1999 to 
provide structure to regional transmission organizations.   
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(Brennan 1998).  The provisions of EPACT, along with FERC orders 888 and 889 once 
again set the stage for sweeping changes in the electric  industry, which later became 
known as “electricity deregulation”, or “electricity restructuring” (Joskow 1996).  The 
push to deregulate the electric industry followed previous efforts of other industries. The 
railroad, airline, banking, and telecommunication industries had all already undergone 
significant deregulation during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Hirsh 1999).  It was the 
hope that in light of technological innovations, primarily in the form of new efficient 
combined-cycle natural gas fired generation, which could be supply both base-load and 
peaking power at a significantly reduced cost than traditional base-load coal and nuclear 
plants, that deregulation would also help transform the U.S. electric industry thus leading 
to lower consumer costs (Kuhn et al. 1996).    
The thinking at the time was that PURPA would provide consumers benefit from 
even greater competition between wholesale several smaller, less expensive wholesale 
generators, rather than a few large capital intensive base-load coal or nuclear power 
plants (Joskow 2001).  FERC Orders 888 and 889 were intended to facilitate these 
wholesale power transactions by decoupling the transmission and generation of electricity 
from retail distribution, which were already regulated by state utility commissions 
eventually leading to lower retail rates (Chao and Peck 1996).  Even prior to the FERC 
Orders 888 and 889, faced with increasing pressure from utilities to recover stranded 
costs, the CPUC had already taken steps to restructure its electric industry (Kuhn 1996).   
In 1992, the CPUC issued a directive to explore methods to reform the state’s 
regulatory environment to provide more retail competition (CPUC 1992). The resulting 
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“Yellow Book” thus named for the color of the report’s cover, published in 1993 called 
for unbundling electricity generation from transmission, and retail sales in order to allow 
market forces to drive more competitive retail electric rates (CPUC 1993). The Yellow 
Book was followed two years later by “Blue Book” which laid out the regulatory 
framework for electric industry restructuring in California (CPUC 1994).  The Blue Book 
proposed phasing in retail electric competition in the state by providing consumers with 
direct access to wholesale electricity and replacing the current cost of service rate 
structure with a performance-based approach. The issue of stranded utility investments 
would be mitigated through a limited “competitive transition charge” requiring each retail 
customer to pay for the privilege of open market access, while also allowing IOUs to 
recover the cost of investment in idle generation capacity.  In order to ensure fair 
transmission and distribution of wholesale electricity, the CPUC issued a directive in 
1995 creating a separate Independent Systems Operator (ISO) to manage the state’s 
transmission network, and Power Exchange (PX) to act as a wholesale electricity 
clearinghouse (CPUC 1995). 
The California legislature codified these decisions through the passage of the 
Electricity Industry Restructuring Act (Assembly Bill 1890) in 1996, which effectively 
legally separated electricity generation, transmission, and distribution in California 
without fundamentally altering private utility ownership, quality of service or reliability 
standards. While IOUs could still own some generation, transmission, and distribution 
assets, they would be forced to hand over coordination of transmission activities to 
CAISO and were forced to purchase even self-generated wholesale electricity through the 
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PX.  Under electric industry restructuring PG&E and SCE divested 50 percent of their 
generating assets and SDG&E divested all of its fossil fuel generation as a condition of a 
previously approved merger between Enova and Pacific Enterprises (EIA 1999).    
Prior to AB 1890, the energy efficiency and conservation programs were under 
the direct control of the CPUC, while the CEC maintained responsibility for renewable 
energy research. In less than a year after AB 1890 became law, PG&E, SCE, and 
SDG&E worked with FERC to create the structure and operating rules for CAISO and 
PX to provide for open access to other retail providers as called for in AB 1890 (FERC 
1997). While AB 1890 itself seemed to be a fair compromise between the interests of 
utility companies, consumers, and state and federal regulators, in promoting effective 
retail competition, its implementation, as well as the enactment of subsequent legislation 
designed to clarify operational procedures of electric restructuring, ultimately led to the 
demise of retail competition itself.  The first of these bills, AB 360 (1997), allowed IOUs 
to issue bonds to recoup some of its stranded generation investments.
6
  An additional 
provision of AB 1890 called for a 10 percent reduction in retail electric rates and for 
those rates to be frozen until March 2002 or until such time that stranded costs could be 
recovered through competitive transition charges.  
Despite these bonds and the competitive transition charge, nearly all of the state’s 
IOUs began to divest at least some of their generating assets. In 1998, PG&E announced 
its intent to sell 13 natural gas-fired plants and one geothermal facility to recoup stranded 
                                                          
6
 The amount authorized by AB 360 was $7.3 million. 
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investments. SCE and SDG&E also made plans to sell generating assets to newly formed 
generating holding companies. While retail prices remained fixed, once CAISO and PX 
went online in March 1998, wholesale prices were allowed to fluctuate. In the summer of 
1999, SDG&E began to experience price volatility in its service territory as wholesale 
prices surpassed retail price caps and after divesting some its generating assets earlier 
than expected, subsequently petitioned the CPUC to end the freeze on its retail rates 
(Sweeney 2002). 
 
ELECTRICITY CRISIS 
In early 2000, PG&E and SCE began to experience similar price volatility as 
wholesale electricity marketers, the most famous of which being Enron, began to 
monopolize available power during high peak periods leading to a spike in wholesale 
electric prices (Egan 2005). In the midst of a very hot summer of 2000 several areas in 
California experienced rolling blackouts as wholesale electricity prices far exceeded 
authorized retail electric rates, causing a shortage in the available cost-effective power 
utilities could provide (Joskow and Kahn 2002). The ensuing electricity crisis of 2000-
2001 nearly bankrupted all three of the state’s IOUs as they were forced to purchase 
wholesale electricity well above what they could recover (Sweeny 2002). By December 
2000, it was estimated that the state’s IOUs were losing up to $50 million a day, leaving 
both PG&E and SCE financially insolvent by January 2001 (Joskow 2002). While the 
CPUC initially resisted calls to cease wholesale electricity sales, the California legislature 
passed Assembly Bill 970 (AB 970) in a futile attempt to keep ahead of the crisis by 
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reducing the power plant permitting process from one year to six months.
7
  These efforts 
fell short as new generation facilities were not available soon enough to provide adequate 
additional wholesale electricity to the market. Eventually FERC intervened in the crises 
by investigating the manipulation of wholesale prices by power marketing company 
Enron. Eventually, wholesale electricity prices returned to normal by the summer of 
2001. Subsequent lawsuits by SCE forced the CPUC to declare an effective end to retail 
electric competition in the state in October 2001 (Sweeney 2002).  While electric industry 
restructuring was ineffective in transitioning California toward full retail competition, it 
did significantly impact the electricity landscapes of California and neighboring Arizona.    
 The divestiture of the majority of California IOU generating assets increased 
utility reliance on non-utility commercial generation as well as additional electricity 
imports from the Pacific Northwest and Desert Southwest (Figure 3).  Between 1997 and 
2011, California’s total electricity consumption increased by 19 percent from 230,243 
GWh in 1997 to 284,953 GWh in 2011. Concurrently, electricity imports, as a percent of 
total electricity consumption, increased by over 38 percent during the same period of 
time, from 52,720 GWh in 1997, to 84,539 GWh in 2011 (CEC 2012d). The vast 
majority of these additional electricity imports were supplied by generators located in the 
Desert Southwest, primarily Arizona. Electricity imports from the Desert Southwest more 
than doubled from 27,517 GWh in 1997 to 56,821 GWh in 2011, while electricity 
imported from generators located in the Pacific Northwest increased by only a modest 
                                                          
7
 The intent of Assembly Bill 970 was to reduce power plant licensing process from 12 
months to 6 months and was scheduled to go into effect in January 1, 2004.  
 
27 
 
 
 
 
nine percent from 25,204 GWh in 1997 to 27,718 GWh in 2011 (CEC 2012d).  Much of 
the increase in electricity imports from the Desert Southwest can be explained by the fact 
that electricity supplied by generators in the Pacific Northwest is primarily from 
hydroelectric resources.  Given that hydroelectric facilities have generally limited 
capacity for expansion, California utilities were forced to look east towards wholesale 
merchant power plants in Arizona for additional sources of supply.   
 
Figure 3 
 
California Electric Supply by Generation Source (1997-2011) (GWh)  
 
 
Source: CEC Electricity Consumption Database (CEC 2012d).  
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into the EPACT category defined as EWG. Many of the in-state generating assets 
divested by PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E following AB 1890 were purchased by EWG, 
such as AES Corporation, Duke Energy, NRG, Mirant, Dynegy, and Reliant and others. 
Though merchant generators, given their EWG status are not required to supply 
electricity to a specific geographic service territory and are free to sell wholesale 
electricity to any entity in the market based on hourly, daily, or other spot market 
mechanisms in practice these  merchant operators, in reality most, if not all of these new 
domestic merchant generators  almost immediately  entered into long-term power 
contracts to supply base load power to the IOUs from which they were purchased assets 
(CEC 2011). With additional domestic wholesale merchant resources unavailable, and 
hydroelectric supplies from the Pacific Northwest at, or near, capacity, California utilities 
turned to an emerging wholesale merchant generation market in Arizona to meet its 
additional resource requirements.  
 
ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING IN ARIZONA 
The State of Arizona has long been a major supplier of electricity to California.  
Southern California Edison already holds an ownership stake in Arizona’s largest power 
plant, the massive 3,875 MW Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) and 
much of the supply from this power plant is used to supply SCE customers.  Electric 
restructuring in Arizona stimulated the construction of additional wholesale merchant 
generators, which could also be called upon to provide additional supplies to SCE, as 
well as PG&E and SDG&E, both utilities which also share connections to the Palo Verde 
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transmission hub.  In December 1996, only months after similar AB 1890 was passed in 
California, the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) passed the “Retail Electric 
Competition Rule.” Similar to AB 1890, this “Rule” authorized retail competition in 
Arizona, permitted utility companies to recover stranded costs, and allowed consumers to 
choose between retail electric providers (Walls 2000).  This paved the way for the 
construction of several new merchant generators in Arizona to take advantage of new 
market opportunities in within Arizona as well as in newly opened markets in California.  
Between June of 1998 and June of 2000, several private merchant electricity 
generation companies petitioned the ACC to allow the construction of up to 13 merchant 
power plants, primarily in the western portion of the state (Hedler 2000).  In order to 
provide some perspective, prior to 1998, there were only 34 power plants of any type in 
Arizona (EIA 2012a).  By December 2002, in its Second Biennial Transmission 
Assessment, the ACC estimated that it would need to significantly upgrade the state’s 
existing transmission network to accommodate up to 21 new electricity generation 
facilities totaling over 11,817 MW in additional installed capacity between 2001 and 
2005 (EIA 2012a).  A total of 16,583.9 MW of electric generation capacity had been 
installed in Arizona from 1926 to 2000, including massive energy projects such as the 
Glen Canyon Dam (1,155 MW) in 1963, the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station 
(2,409.3 MW) from 1974-1976, as well as Palo Verde (EIA 2012a).  
 The pace of construction of natural-gas fired generating plants in Arizona during 
a span of four years, far outstripped any previous energy projects in the state and far 
exceed the future projected resources needed by Arizona utilities, even taking into 
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account double digit population growth (ACC 2002).  An alternative explanation for the 
construction of these plants was to serve newly opened markets in California. Merchant 
power companies took advantage of deregulation efforts in Arizona with the ultimate 
intent of selling excess wholesale capacity to California. Indeed, several of these 
merchant generators were constructed near Hassayampa and Jojoba switchyard which 
provide easy access to the high voltage transmission lines of the Palo Verde bus bar, 
about 40 miles southwest of Phoenix.  In 2002 alone, five new merchant generators, with 
a combined capacity of 6,010 MW began transmitting electricity across the Palo Verde 
distribution system, including Redhawk Units 1 and 2 (1,060 MW) , Arlington Valley 
Unit 1 (580 MW), Mesquite (1,250 MW), Harquahala (1,040 MW) and Panda Gila River 
(2,080) (ACC 2004).  Figure 4 illustrates the Palo Verde transmission system in 2004, 
while merchant generation applications in Arizona as represented in ACC biennial 
transmission assessments and EIA-860 Annual Operator Reports are represented in Table 
2.  
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Figure 4 
 
Schematic of Generation Additions in Arizona (2002)  
 
Source: Arizona Corporation Commission Second Biennial Transmission Assessment 
(ACC 2002) 
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Table 2 
 
Arizona Natural Gas Generation Projects (2000-2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Arizona Corporation Commission Second and Third Biennial Transmission 
Assessment (ACC 2002; ACC 2004 
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In April 2003, Arizona Public Service Company (APS), the largest utility in the 
state, issued a report stating: “For residential and smaller commercial customers, 
transaction costs of retail choice have been more significant than first believed…APS 
does not believe that the Retail Electric Competition Rules should be continued in their 
present form (APS 2003).”  The following year, the Arizona Court of Appeals declared 
the ACC decision requiring utilities to divest their generation assets was unconstitutional 
given that the agency did not provide an adequate explanation as to how these 
divestitures would help to control electric rates (ACA 2004). Following the Court of 
Appeals decisions, the ACC took no significant additional action to promote retail 
competition leading to a de facto suspension of electric industry restructuring in the state.   
Following the suspension of retail price competition in Arizona in 2004, many of 
these merchant power plants were subsequently purchased by APS, Salt River Project 
(SRP), and Tucson Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Nonetheless, given the 
tremendous additional generating capacity afforded by these new merchant operators, 
Arizona generators were able to increase electricity exports by 60 percent from 23,144 
GWh in 2000 to 34,447 GWh in 2010. These electricity exports represented nearly one-
third of state’s total electricity supply (112,000 GWh in 2010) (EIA 2012b).  Based on 
estimates in Pasqualetti and Kelley (2008), approximately one half of these total exports 
in 2010 (14,928.91 GWh) were supplied directly to California utilities.  Based on the 
estimates contained in this study, we were able to confirm that at least 30 percent (4,520 
GWh) of these total exports are supplied by merchant generators to California IOUs on 
an annual basis.  This additional wholesale merchant generation is generally more 
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expensive that domestic electricity supply and is primarily used to supply peaking power 
only.  
 
DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT 
 
 As an alternative to increased electricity imports, California utilities are also 
pursuing extremely aggressive demand side management activities. Since the 1970s, 
California has led the nation in the developing and promoting demand side management 
programs (Nadel and Geller 1996). The purpose of utility DSM programs is to reduce 
electricity consumption and peak load demand through a mixture of consumer education 
and financial incentives.  The California State and Consumer Services Agency (CSCSA) 
estimates that between 1975 and 2000, California energy efficiency programs have offset 
the need to construct roughly 10,000 MW of electrical generation capacity (CSCSA 
2002).  In fact, per capita electricity consumption has remained relatively flat in 
California over the last thirty years as compared to the rest of the U.S. (see Figure 5). 
This phenomenon is known as the “Rosenfeld Curve” after retired California Energy 
Commissioner Dr. Arthur Rosenfeld (Cavanagh 2009).  While some of this reduced 
consumption can be attributed to changes in the composition of the state’s industrial base, 
smaller average household sizes, and other factors, utility administered DSM programs 
have undoubtedly contributed to electricity reductions (Sudarshan and Sweeney 2008).   
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Figure 5 
 
“Rosenfeld Curve” -- Per Capita Electricity Consumption Change in California (1960-
2004) 
 
 
Source: California Energy Commission Energy Consumption Database (CEC 2012b)  
 
Under the least cost utility planning process, utility DSM in California was 
considered a viable resource option on par with supply-side generation additions.  
California IOUs actively invested in DSM, particularly in high load growth areas as a 
cost-effective means to mitigate transmission constraints, as well as manage the 
commissioning of new generation capacity. During the 1980s and 1990s, the CPUC 
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regulated utility energy efficiency programs as a resource on par with new generation 
capacity. The CPUC set energy efficiency goals for each of the state’s IOUs, which, in 
turn, would administer the programs and earning incentives through a share-holder 
incentive mechanism based on the achieving savings goals, based on “ex post” 
measurement of energy savings. Even though these programs were designed to maximize 
ratepayer and utility benefit (avoided costs), they were not directly tied to a specific 
kilowatt hour (KWh) or Kilowatt (KW) savings goal.  
The use of public benefit funds to finance demand side management activities had 
become commonplace following deregulation as they were considered generation neutral 
and were relatively small (Nadel and Kushler 2000). In that sense, given that utilities had 
little ability to coordinate generation, transmission, and distribution under the terms of 
AB 1890, PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E essentially became temporary DSM program 
administrators. From 1997 through 2001,
8
 the CPUC provided only short term extensions 
to utility energy efficiency (EE) programs on a yearly basis. During this time period, 
incentives paid to utilities based on milestone achievements (number of audits performed, 
measurement of market effects, number of appliances recycled, etc.), rather than a 
resource- benefit basis with only a small portion paid through ex ante verified savings 
(CPUC 2005). 
The divestiture of generating assets, price controls, and other cost cutting 
measures under electric industry restructuring significantly dis-incentivized utility DSM 
investment and made voluntary DSM an undesirable resource planning option for utilities 
                                                          
8
 AB 1890 only provided funding for EE programs through 2002.  
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(Gillingham et al. 2004).  In light of this fact, the CPUC required the IOUs to collect a 
public goods charge (PGC) equivalent to one percent of their utility bills to finance 
demand side management activities, a practice which had become commonplace in other 
states following electric industry restructuring (Nadel and Kushler 2000, Kushler and 
Witte 2001).  Within the provisions of AB 1890, these funds would be used to finance 
cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation, low-income energy assistance, public 
interest research and development, and renewable energy technologies.
9
  Still, utility 
investment in DSM activity remained rather flat as they struggled to control internal costs 
in the wake of divesting their generating assets.  
Immediately following the California Energy Crisis of 2000-2001 and the 
subsequent suspension of electric restructuring in the state, the CPUC moved quickly to 
reinstate integrated supply and demand side management, though the focus and goals of 
these programs were to be directed toward short-term energy efficiency measures and 
peak load reduction to mitigate against potential future crises (Goldman et al. 2002).  The 
commission continued funding energy efficiency programs on a yearly basis from 1998 
through 2003, and a two year “bridge period” for 2004 and 2005 based (CPUC 2004a). 
During this timeframe (1998-2005), PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E customers had 
contributed a total of $1.8 billion toward energy efficiency programs through the public 
goods charge (PGC) (CPUC 2004b). This funding was roughly equal to 1.5 percent of 
annual IOU retail sales resulting in roughly 1,400 GWh and 300 MW in energy savings 
                                                          
9
 AB 1890; In 2000, the California legislature passed AB 995 and AB 1194 which 
extended PGC funding for ten additional years (AB95, AB 1194).   
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over a span of seven years. This amounted to only roughly one percent of combined 
annual retail electric sales (CPUC 2004b).  In 2005, the CEC published a study which 
determined that demand side management program funding proved to be more cost 
effective than any other form of supply-side options (CEC 2003). During 2004, base load 
generation cost roughly 5.8 cents per kWh, shoulder load 11.8 cents per kWh, and 
especially peak load generation at 16.7 cents per kWh, making demand side management 
clearly the most cost effective resource option.
10
  In 2000, the average cost of DSM 
programs amounted to 3.7 cents per kWh saved through energy efficiency programs. By 
2004, the cost of saved energy dropped dramatically to an average of 1.1 cents per kWh 
saved (CEC 2005). In comparison, the average retail residential cost of electricity in 2004 
averaged approximately 11.78 cents per kWh across all three IOUs (CEC 2005).  
The findings confirmed an earlier study released in 2002 commissioned by the 
independent Energy Foundation and Hewlett Foundation by Xenergy, Inc. entitled, 
“California’s Secret Energy Surplus: The Potential for Energy Efficiency “(Rufo and 
Coito 2002). This study, which largely shaped DSM policy in the ensuing years, analyzed 
consumer behavior and electricity use patterns in the wake of the electricity crisis with 
the goal of determining potential achievable energy efficiency savings.   The study 
concluded that peak energy demand growth, which was expected to grow from 53,000 
MW in 2001 to 63,000 MW in 2011, and could be effectively curtailed by up to 50 
                                                          
10
 Base load generation refers to the minimum amount of generation which is always 
available; usually base load electricity is generally provided by coal or nuclear-fired 
generators; shoulder load refers to the early morning when commercial and industrial 
operations begin (8 AM- 1 PM), and in the evening when residential consumption is 
highest (7 PM - 9PM). 
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percent through significant investment in utility DSM program (See Figure 6). Using 
existing DSM funding levels equating to $2 billion over the course of the next 10 years, 
the study found that IOUs would receive nearly $5.5 billion in net benefits (avoided 
generation, transmission, and distribution costs), and that incremental increases in energy 
efficiency investment above those levels would result in exponentially greater net 
benefits (Rufo and Coito 2002). 
 
Figure 6 
 
California Secret Energy Surplus Study DSM Potential Forecast (2002-2012) 
 
Source: California’s Secret Energy Surplus: The Potential for Energy Efficiency, 2002 
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This study came to be one of the most cited documents in CPUC and CEC reports 
regarding utility DSM and laid the foundation for the California’s first Energy Action 
Plan released in 2003 (EAP 2003). The stated goal of EAP 2003 was to: “Ensure that 
adequate, reliable, and reasonably-priced electrical power and natural gas supplies, 
including prudent reserves, are achieved and provided through policies, strategies, and 
actions that are cost-effective and environmentally sound for California’s consumers and 
taxpayers.”  In order to meet this goal, the report defined a specific ranking of “preferred” 
energy resources. This ranking, which eventually become known as a “loading order” 
included six key broad areas of importance to energy policy in the state: (1) optimize 
energy conservation and resource efficiency, (2) accelerate the state’s goal for renewable 
generation, (3) ensure reliable, affordable electricity generation, (4) upgrade and expand 
the electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure, (5) promote consumer and 
utility owned distributed generation, and, (6) ensure reliable supply of reasonably priced 
natural gas (EAP 2003).
 11
   While only nine pages long, this document succinctly 
outlined a series of actionable steps to achieve the state’s energy goals.  
With respect to DSM program activities, EAP 2003 defined several action items 
intended to minimize the need for additional generation capacity, as well as link 
environmental concerns (namely GHG emission reductions), improved electric reliability, 
and price stabilization. Specific steps included in the policy statement were to: (1) 
implement a voluntary dynamic pricing system to reduce peak demand by as much as 
                                                          
11
 Although the term “loading order” cannot be found in EAP 2003, it has since become a 
common reference used to describe resource preference. 
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1,500 to 2,000 MW by 2007 
12
, (2) improve new and remodeled building efficiency by 
five percent
13
, (3) improve air conditioner efficiency by 10 percent above federally 
mandated standard
14
, (4) make every new state building a model of energy efficiency
15
, 
(5) create customer incentive for aggressive energy reduction, (6) provide utilities with 
demand response and energy efficiency investment rewards comparable to the return on 
investment in new power and transmission projects, (7) increase local government 
conservation and energy efficiency programs, (8) incorporate, as per Public Resources 
Code section 25402, distributed generation or renewable technologies into energy 
efficiency standards for new building construction, and,
 16
 (9) encourage companies that 
invest into energy conservation and resource efficiency to register with the state’s 
Climate Change Registry (EAP 2005). Nearly all of these action items were integrated  
into the CPUC Decision D. 04-09-060 released in 2004, but intended for energy 
efficiency program cycles for 2006 and beyond (CPUC 2004). This decision also 
                                                          
12
 The CPUC had already implemented policy directive R-02-02-001 in 2002 to evaluate 
and implement these pricing systems.   
 
13
 In 2003, the CEC had already released a draft version of proposed building standards 
(which were to go into effect in 2005) designed to attain this energy reduction goal.  
 
14
  Recently released federal appliance standards were expected to result in a 20 percent 
increase in energy efficiency; additional efficiency standards in California over and 
above federal standards were expected to garner a further 10 percent increase incremental 
efficiency.  
 
15
 No specific direction was provided in the document as to neither how this goal would 
be attained nor what metric by which it would be measured.  
 
16
 CPRC section 25402 was a legislated action directing the CPUC to reduce unnecessary 
consumption of energy  
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identified the achievable energy efficiency goals outlined in the Secret Energy Surplus 
Study as the baseline “stretch goals” for attainable IOU energy savings, and ordered state 
IOUs to integrate these energy efficiency goals into resource acquisition and procurement 
plans (CPUC 2004).  
In 2005, the CPUC and CEC, along with input from CAISO, released Energy 
Action Plan (EAP 2005), as an update to EAP 2003 integrating various state executive 
orders, CEC integrated planning reports, CPUC decisions, and legislative initiatives.
17
  
EAP 2005 reaffirmed the policy statements of EAP 2003 and included additional 
provisions to address the emerging issue of climate change, transportation-related energy 
activities, and several research and development initiatives (EAP 2005).  This document 
also affirmed the state’s commitment that “cost effective energy efficiency is the resource 
of first choice for meeting California’s energy needs” while also providing the first 
cohesive set of historical energy efficiency investment data, including budgets through 
2013 (See Figures 7 and 8).
18
  This data described key phases of energy efficiency with 
the state over the past 30 years from the implementation of appliance standards, through 
the development of utility incentive mechanisms, electric industry restructuring, the 
subsequent energy crisis, and projected investment in energy efficiency through 
integrated resource planning. 
                                                          
17
 By this point in time, the Consumer Power and Conservation Financing Authority had 
ceased operations and consequently was no longer included in energy policy planning.  
 
18
 EAP 2005 section 2; many references commonly misrepresent EAP 2003 as the basis 
for energy efficiency being the first in the state’s loading order; however, it is only in 
EAP 2005 that the position of energy efficiency is affirmed as being the “first choice” 
energy resource.  
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Figure 7 
 
Historical Peak Energy Savings from Energy Efficiency Program and Standards Data 
(1975-2003)  
 
Source: Energy Action Plan 2005 
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Figure 8 
 
Historical and Projected California Investment in Energy Efficiency  
 
Source: Energy Action Plan 2005 
 
Energy Action Plan 2005 also expanded on the actionable steps included in EAP 
2003 in order to increase “non-resource” energy efficiency efforts through public 
outreach and education, energy efficiency research, demonstration projects, and improved 
post ante evaluation, measurement and verification efforts (which to this point had been 
cursory at best) which were to be integrated into the IOUs 2006-2008 energy efficiency 
program cycle. Key actions outlined in EAP 2005 included: (1) requiring that cost-
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effective demand-side energy efficiency options be integrated into IOU resource plans on 
par with new supply-side generation requirements, (2) that the CPUC adopt 2006-2008 
energy efficiency program portfolios and finalize funding levels for these programs no 
later than 2005, (3) creating additional “non-resource” energy efficiency marketing, 
education and outreach program during the next program cycle
19
, (4) creating a balanced 
portfolio of base load and peak load electricity reductions while maintaining long term 
reliability, (5) integrating demand response (emergency peak load reduction) with energy 
efficiency, (6) improving building performance standards in government buildings to 
reduce electricity purchased by 20 percent by 2015, (7) assisting IOUs in building 
business cases for energy efficiency programs, (8) adopting new efficient appliance 
standards, (9) adopting new building standards to include demand response and solar 
photovoltaic technologies, (10) increasing the availability of state-backed low interest 
loans for energy efficiency and distributed generation technologies, (11) improving 
energy efficiency programs for low income and “hard to reach” market sections, (12) 
adopting a performance based incentive structure in 2006 to encourage IOU energy 
efficiency investment, (13) updating evaluation, measurement, and verification protocols 
to include associated environmental benefits, particularly emissions reductions, in future 
resource plans, (14) identifying opportunities to increase water system optimization as a 
vehicle for reduced peak energy consumption and, finally, (15) supporting 
                                                          
19
 Traditional energy efficiency retrofits and measure installation, including appliance 
recycling efforts have been considered “resource’ program. Up to that point, with the 
exception of buildings and standards, there was very little coordination between public 
outreach through “non-resource” programs outside of compliance with federal public 
awareness mandates in place since the late 1970s.  
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recommendations for building system retrofits in state buildings as required by Assembly 
Bill 549 (CPUC 2003). These actions, as outlined in EAP 2005 set the stage for the first 
truly integrated energy efficiency program cycle, which was set to begin in 2006 and end 
in 2008. 
Based on the policy decisions set forth in EAP 2005, the CPUC released an 
interim opinion outlining energy efficiency portfolio plans and program levels for the 
next three years Decision 05-09-043, released in September 2005, authorized PG&E, 
SCE, and SDG&E to develop specific types of energy efficiency programs under the 
umbrella of a unified program portfolio with the intent that these activities should be 
sufficient to meet up to 50% utility resource needs  for the next ten years (CPUC 2005). 
This was a departure from previous energy efficiency program cycles which afforded 
individual utilities with very little autonomy in program administration. The decision 
provided guidance to utilities that their programs should be both cost effective, meaning 
the value of the energy savings should be greater than the cost of measures,
20
 as well as 
the cost of utility program administration and shareholder incentives. Preceding utility 
energy efficiency program filings estimated that the 2006-2008 program cycle would 
save an estimated 500 MW of generation capacity over the course of the three year cycle 
at a cost of $800 million per year (including associated post ante program evaluation, 
measurement, & verification (EM&V) costs).  
                                                          
20
 The term “measure” is used to describe not only the physical energy efficiency 
technology installed, but also the cost of energy efficiency installation and associated 
project costs incurred.  
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The Decision identified general “statewide” programs in which all utilities would 
participate, as well specific program administered by each utility, but operated through a 
competitive third party solicitation process. These incentive programs included both 
“upstream” incentives in which the utility buys works with manufacturers to buy down 
the cost of energy efficient technologies so they can be sold at stores below retail price, 
and “downstream” rebates, in which customers are reimbursed for a least portion of the 
cost measure installation. All three IOUs coordinated their activities to develop 
“statewide” rules and incentives structures for both upstream and downstream programs, 
the most popular of which become known as “Express Efficiency” and “Standard 
Performance Contract.” Express Efficiency allowed customers to purchase energy 
efficient technologies and received a fixed rebate per measure installed, whereas rebates 
for Standard Performance Contracts were based on the verifiable electricity saving and 
the technology installed.  
Both of these programs have continued into subsequent program cycles though 
they are known by different names.  In addition to statewide programs, all three IOUs 
developed a portfolio of targeted programs for “hard- to reach” customer segments.  The 
target market approach was designed to provide select customer segments with a tailored 
energy efficiency, financing, incentives, retro-commissioning, design assistance, and 
rebates to maximize customer savings over time, such as agriculture, schools, large retail, 
industrial, healthcare, lodging, data centers, and new construction segments.  All three 
IOUs were also required to coordinate activities for the assessment of emerging 
technologies, codes and standards efforts (collectively known as Title 24), and 
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engineering assessments within their own authorized budgets.  Within the guise of the 
“Flex Your Power” campaign, all utilities were required to coordinate energy efficiency 
marketing activities across all media including: television, radio and newspaper ads, 
printed educational materials, events, a comprehensive website resource serving all 
parties statewide, a biweekly electronic newsletter, forums and workshops, and 
partnerships with businesses, local governments, water agencies, non-profits and others, 
including the state and federal government agencies responsible for energy and water 
efficiency.  Finally, each utility was required to develop local government partnerships to 
provide marketing, education, and outreach, facilities retrofits, construction and rebate 
assistance, as well as emerging technologies demonstrations within their authorized 
budgets. 
Following a bridge period in 2009, the CPUC authorized $3.1 billion in rate-payer 
funds to finance the 2010 through 2012 IOU program cycle.  Many of the programs 
developed during the 2006 through 2008 program cycle were continued as mechanisms to 
effectively reduce the need for new power plant construction as well as achieve the 
“complimentary policy” goals of carbon reduction described in the CARB AB32 Scoping 
Plan.  In addition, each of the state’s IOUs have made significant strides in improving 
program performance and processes, including engineering assessments,  incentive 
applications,  customer outreach and marketing.  The energy savings achieved during the 
2010-2012 program, release in February 2013 totaled over 7,672.45 GWh in electricity 
savings and 1,397.64 MW in peak demand reduction (CEC 2013). 
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SUMMARY 
The California electricity system has undergone significant structural change over 
the course of the last fifty years culminating in a fundamental restructuring of its electric 
industry and increased electricity imports from neighboring states, namely Arizona.  This 
section provided a brief overview of some of the more pertinent issues facing the state’s 
electric industry with added emphasis on the evolution of the industry, GHG emissions 
reductions goals, and utility administered DSM programs.   The next section describes 
the evolution of GHG emission assessments specific to California with added emphasis 
on GHG emission factors, inventories, and current efforts by IOUs to estimate avoided 
emission reductions as a result of DSM activity.    
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CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
Emission factors and emission inventories are fundamental tools of GHG 
emissions estimates (Southerland 1982).   They provide a basic framework for analyzing 
relative source emission estimate for all GHG assessment, mitigation, and management 
activities.  The following section describes the evolution of emission factors and emission 
inventories, with particular attention to the way in which these analytical tools are used to 
estimate emission, or in the case of this study, “avoided” emission estimates.  Particular 
attention will also be given to how emission estimates and emission inventories have 
been used in assessing emissions estimates with respect to electrical generation in 
California. In that respect, this study will touch upon emission factors developed by the 
California Climate Action Registry (CCAR), emissions inventories developed by CARB, 
and, finally, the CPUC “E3” calculator used currently by the state’s IOUs to assess 
emissions based on in-state generation activity.  
 
EMISSION FACTORS 
The genesis of emission factors lay with the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1963, which  
required the EPA to develop a national standard for several atmospheric pollutants, 
including carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, 
hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants (CAA 1963).  After several additional 
intermediate amendments, the 1990 CAA expanded the list of pollutants to 189, including 
those most commonly associated with electrical production, which are believed to be 
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responsible for between 30 and 40 percent of total anthropogenic atmospheric pollution. 
The primary pollutants emitted as a result of fossil-fuel based fuel combustion are carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N20). The EPA has recently been given 
the regulatory authority to regulate these emissions under the authority of the CAA in 
January 2011 (EPA 2012). 
In order to quantify, track, and inventory these pollutants, the EPA initially relied 
on a compilation of emission factors published by the U.S. Public Health Service in 1968, 
which were later revised in 1972 and 1985. These emission factors were intended to 
represent a relative quantity of pollutants expressed in terms of the weight of the pollutant 
divided by the distance, duration, heat rate, or production of the polluting activity (e.g. 
lbs. of CO per mile driven, grams of CH4 per MMBtu, or kg of CO2 per MWh electricity 
generated (EPA 2010a).   The most common measure of general GHG emissions from 
electricity generation is known as “Carbon Dioxide Equivalency” (CO2e), which describe 
the equivalent mixture of a number of greenhouse gases in terms of the amount of CO2 
with the same global warming potential (GWP).  As a baseline, CO2 has a GWP of 
exactly one, whereas methane and nitrous oxide have global warming potential of twenty 
five and two hundred eighty six respectively, meaning that one kilogram of methane has 
a global warming potential twenty five times greater than one kg of carbon dioxide, and 
one kilogram of nitrous oxide has a global warming potential equal to two hundred eighty 
six times that of one kilogram of carbon dioxide.   
These factors are widely used to facilitate the estimation of representative 
averages of available data regarding the relative amount of pollutants emits from various 
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sources of per unit of activity (EPA 1999).
 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) uses 
these established emission factors to estimate emissions for fossil fuel based electricity 
generation sources on an annual basis (DOE 2000).  The DOE then aggregates these 
generator emission factors to develop average emission factors for various regions within 
the U.S (U.S. DOE 2001). The equations for estimating emissions and emission reduction 
activity using emission factors are described in Equations 1 and 2, respectively:  
 
Equation 1 
Estimating Emissions Using Emission Factors 
 E = A x EF 
Where: 
 E represents emissions, in terms of the weight of the pollutant (e.g. kilograms, 
pounds, metric tons, etc.) 
 A represents the rate of activity (e.g. miles, MMBtu, MW, etc.) 
 EF represents the emission factor, in terms of weight of the pollutant per rate of 
activity.  
Equation 2 
Estimating Emission Reduction Activity Using Emission Factors 
E = A x EF x (1-ER/100)  
Where: 
 E represents emissions, in terms of the weight of the pollutant (e.g. kilograms, 
pounds, metric tons, etc.) 
 A represents the rate of activity (e.g. miles, MMBtu, MW, etc.) 
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 EF represents the emission factor, in terms of weight of the pollutant per rate of 
activity.  
 ER represents the efficiency of emission reduction controls applied in terms of 
percentage efficiency.  
Given that the basic research question of this study (What quantity of CO2e are 
attributed to lowered demand from Arizona-based resources by California IOUs as a 
result of their DSM activity during the 2010 through 2012 DSM program cycle?) 
involves estimating avoided emissions as a result of electricity reduction activity, it 
would be accurate to say that this study simply involved solving for “ER.” While true, the 
method by which to derive ER is no easy task. Estimating emission reductions, or in this 
case “avoided emissions” involves a deep understanding of the dynamic between electric 
generation, transmission, and consumption. Complicating matters further is the fact that 
the electricity California consumers rely upon is generated by a diverse mix of electric 
generations based on different fuels, each with its own respective unique emission 
factors. While some of these fuel types produce no emissions, such as hydroelectric or 
solar electric generators, others, namely natural gas, coal, and biomass.   
Adding to the complexity of the study is the fact that these generation resources 
are operated, or dispatched at various times of day and year in different sequences, 
known as dispatch orders or loading orders.  Once this electricity is produced, it is then 
transmitted over several hundred miles where some of it is lost due to radiative forcing, 
until it is finally distributed to utility customers.  At this point in time, there seems to be 
no practical method to truly trace electricity directly from primary generator along a 
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single transmission path and to the final consumer, much less determine what emissions 
were “avoided” as a result of one, or many of those consumers reducing their electricity 
usage.  The purpose of this study is to almost do just that…but before moving to the 
methodology employed in this study, it is important to consider some of the preliminary 
work of others entities involved in GHG emission estimates in California, such as CCAR, 
CARB, and the CPUC.   
 
CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY 
The California Climate Action Registry was established in 2000 as a voluntary 
GHG emission registry by which entities could report their annual direct GHG emissions 
and have those emissions estimates verified by an independent auditing firm accredited in 
the organizations reporting protocols.  While the CCAR protocols are very rigorous and 
employ methods similar to those employed by national and international standards 
organizations, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), they do not 
fully account for total utility emissions (Little 2002).  Instead of total emissions, these 
reports include only “directly” emitted utility emissions as a result of utility controlled 
generation activity. These do not include estimates of electricity imported, then sold to 
consumers per se (CCAR 2002). This makes it extremely difficult to develop a complete 
emission factor from which to derive emission reduction activity without taking into 
account sources of over 30 percent of total electricity consumption, namely imported 
electricity. Without information regarding exact sources of electricity imports, CCAR, 
instead, focused on establishing an aggregate baseline emission factors for each utility’s 
respective GHG generation mix based on generation originating from within California, 
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and under utility control only, though the organization later weighted some of these 
emission factors based on published utility power supply labels required under Senate 
Bill 1305. Nonetheless, CCAR emission reports were important components of 
developing a standardize and verifiable method to compare the relative pollution emitted 
per unit generated across utilities within the state and it was an important first step in 
assisting CARB in eventually developing a complete emissions inventory for the state.  
 
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD 
 The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is tasked with implementing the 
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB32)  which seeks to “identify, 
quantify, and set value to carbon emissions with the overarching goal of promoting more 
efficient electrical generation, through the use of primarily low-carbon and non-carbon 
based energy resources (CARB 2008).   Approximately one year after AB32 took effect, 
CARB identified approximately 800 entities across the states that individually emit an 
excess of 25,000 metric tons of CO2e annually. By CARB’s estimates, these electric 
generating facilities, electric retail providers, power marketers, oil refineries, hydrogen 
plants, cement plants, cogeneration facilities, and industrial furnaces represented over 95 
percent of GHG emissions emitted from stationary combustion sources throughout the 
state.  Beginning in 2009, these facilities were required to annually report their emissions 
to the CARB and have these reports independently verified to serve as the baseline for 
future market-based emission reduction compliance mechanisms, with the stated goal of  
administering the first statewide emissions trading program in the western hemisphere.  
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Within these reporting requirements the CARB required utilities to disaggregate 
emissions electricity generated from those purchased from other entities.  Though the 
CARB methodology was is vast improvement over the previous CCAR method, the 
majority of wholesale electricity transactions are still aggregated based on statewide 
average emission factors for unspecified electricity imports. In other words, the inherent 
weakness of the CARB approach is that it does not provide the granularity needed to 
accurately assess the emissions associated with individual utility imports. But that is not 
really the intention of AB32.  The primary purpose of the CARB’s mandatory reporting 
requirement is to develop an emissions trading market. Under CARB’s recently released 
cap and trade rules, in order for a GHG offset project to qualify for an emissions credit  it 
must reduce emissions beyond “business as usual (CCAT 2006).  Under this policy 
interpretation, CARB does not allow utility demand side management activity to qualify 
for emissions credits, given that these activities are already mandated by law and funded 
through the ratepayer PGC funds.  If the CARB estimates are not useful in determining 
offsets from DSM activities, how then, do utilities estimate GHG emission reductions for 
the purposes of reporting to the CPUC?  
 
UTILITY GHG CALCULATIONS 
 Given the importance of climate change in California, surely there must already 
be some method PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E use estimate avoided emissions as a result of 
reductions in electrical use aside from the inventories developed by CCAR and CARB?  
Indeed, all three IOUs utilize an extremely esoteric tool developed by the CPUC, known 
as the “E3” GHG Calculator (E3 2010).  The primary purposes of the E3 GHG calculator 
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are to assess: (1) the impact of implementing AB32 GHG reduction strategies on utility 
customers, (2) the sensitivity of utility operations to these reduction strategies due to 
changes in market forces, such as gas prices, load growth, and energy efficiency costs, 
and (3) influence of additional regulation (e.g. cap and trade, renewable portfolio 
standard, etc.) It is important to understand that the utility industry is a business and that 
all of its operations, including its GHG reduction strategies must operate on the premise 
of the most cost-effective allocation of rate-payer resources. In the sense that the primary 
purpose of the calculator is to measure the cost effectiveness, therefore avoided emissions 
estimates are only a secondary result of the GHG calculator.   
 The GHG calculator relies on the outputs of an extremely complex electricity 
dispatch production model known as PLEXOS.
21
  PLEXOS is an hourly electricity 
dispatch model similar to the U.S. EPA Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated 
Database (eGRID) platform designed specifically to model electricity flows within the 
Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region (EPA 2010b).  The PLEXOS 
model utilizes a mixed integer algorithm to simulate how the operations of generators in 
the western U.S. would adjust to meet load requirements under specific conditions, such 
as fuel prices, power plant capacity, and power plant operations.  Hourly PLEXOS data 
are summarized into four time periods: summer high load, summer low-load, winter high 
load, and winter low load. The results are used as an input into the GHG calculator, 
which in turn, calculates electricity costs and GHG emission rates based on a variety of 
                                                          
21 The PLEXOS model is based on the Ph.D. work of Glenn Drayton (G.R. Drayton. 
Coordinating Energy and Reserves in a Wholesale Electricity Market. University of 
Canterbury, New Zealand, 1997.) 
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different scenarios including variations in fuel prices, power plant capacity factors, and 
other key variables.  This method was utilized to develop GHG emission estimates for the 
current GHG Calculator used by California IOUs to estimate baseline GHG emission 
estimates in 2008 and calculate subsequent avoided emissions estimates for demand side 
management activity during the 2010-2012 IOU DSM program cycle.  
 While the estimates in this model have been deemed relatively accurate 
and credible, the PLEXOS/GHG Calculator combination has many drawbacks. First and 
foremost is the expense and time associated with gathering reliable information for model 
inputs.  Secondly, PLEXOS is proprietary software which operates at a range of load 
level tolerances that makes widely ranging assumptions regarding the relationship 
between load and the market prices of electricity and assumes almost perfect competition 
amongst electricity generators and consumers throughout the western U.S. without 
exploring existing contractual relationships between electricity generators and suppliers.  
The third drawback to this system are the multitude of variables associated with the GHG 
calculator, which also includes a number of inputs that may or may not prove to be 
reasonable assumptions in future estimates.  Amongst these inputs are various 
assumptions regarding energy efficiency (EE), demand response (DR), California Solar 
Initiative (CSI), Combined Heat and Power (CHP), and Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) utility adoption rates (CPUC 2008).  As well, the calculator allows utilities to 
change resource assumptions based on the potential future market price for carbon 
emissions. Finally, the GHG calculator makes several assumptions regarding each group 
of retail providers including power plant ownership, electricity contracts, load growth, 
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system efficiency, and transmission rates that are accurate only enough to develop 
average emission factors across all fuel types.  In reality, the majority of demand side 
management activities tend to reduce peak load demand to a greater extent that base-load 
demand. Given the peculiarities of the resource mix of certain utilities, this could lead to 
a serious overstatement of emission reductions. Furthermore, the tool provides no spatial 
context as to where the emissions were likely reduced.  
Though the CPUC GHG is an extremely useful tool in modeling the potential 
impact of various GHG reduction strategies for various groupings of California retail 
electricity providers, it does not provide enough granularity or sufficiently disaggregated 
information for individual utilities to utilize the tool for resource planning, or, in our case, 
to analyze the spatial context of avoided emission efforts.  It also does not take into 
account individual resource plans or the construction or early retirement of new 
generators within the western U.S. Additionally, though many of the variables can be 
modified by users to account to develop scenario-based analyses, much of the default 
information contained within the model are based on data collected prior to 2008 which 
are extremely dated in the context of analyzing the avoided emissions resulting from the 
2010-2012 program cycle. In essence, the GHG Calculator, though a very useful scenario 
analysis tool, it has only cursory efficacy when applied demand side management 
avoided emission estimates.  
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SUMMARY 
 This section of the study provided an overview of the current state of emissions 
assessment activity from the perspective of private registries, air pollution control 
management authorities, as well as the tool employed by the utilities themselves to 
estimate avoided emissions. It included a brief discussion of the underlying purpose of 
each assessment methodology, as well as their relative strengths and weaknesses. In the 
next section, I will describe the methodology ultimately used to derive a fairly accurate 
avoided emissions estimate based on an expansion of the World Resources Institute 
(WRI) emissions offset approach. Though imperfect in its own respect, this methodology 
provides a fairly rigorous estimate that can be built upon to improve accuracy in future 
models.  
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CHAPTER 4: EMISSIONS ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
MODIFIED WRI METHOD 
 In an attempt to provide more granular emission estimates than those used by the 
CPUC E3 calculator, this study expanded the WRI “Guidelines for Quantifying GHG 
Reductions from Grid-Connected Electricity Projects as a supplement to general 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol for Project Account (WRI 2007). Similar to the CCAR 
protocols, these guidelines define a generally accepted framework that can be used to first 
quantify, then estimate avoided emissions resulting demand side management activities. 
The primary difficulty with these guidelines lay in the fact that they were developed for 
small developing countries which may have only one or two primary sources of 
electricity and are data intensive, though they produce a rather exact and robust result 
(Lazarus and Oven 2001). This section describes the WRI methodology and the various 
modifications employed in this study used to adapt it to estimate avoided emissions as a 
result of DSM activity, with the end result of calculating avoided emissions from a 
specific source and source location.  
 
DEFINING ASSESSMENT BOUNDARY 
The first step in this emissions assessment was to succinctly define the spatial and 
temporal boundaries of the study area (Murtoshaw et al. 2006). While utilities generally 
track directly avoided emissions, or those emissions resulting from changes in 
consumption through the installation of energy efficiency measures at customer locations, 
the focus of this study is to quantify those avoided emissions while determining the 
source of the avoided electricity generation. In this study, the emission assessment 
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boundary is defined as those emissions avoided from electrical generation activity as a 
result of California IOU DSM program activity from 2010 through 2012. This includes 
all sources of electrical generation, both domestically and imported sources of electrical 
generation in operation during this time period that produced electricity which, in turn, 
was ultimately sold to electricity consumers within each respective IOU’s service 
territory.  In such, the first task in this study was to gather detailed records regarding 
electricity consumption as well as purchases by each of these IOUs for the specified time 
period by generation source, fuel type, and location (Bosi 2001). 
 
IOU ELECTRICITY PURCHASES AND CONSUMPTION 
Each California IOU generates, purchases, transmits, and distributes electricity to 
consumers over a vast transmission and distribution network comprised of various 
interconnected power plants, each with their own unique operational and emission 
characteristics. Each of these plants are operated according to each of their unique 
technical and economic advantages, regulatory and system constraints, as well as ultimate 
consumer demand. Generally though, the dispatch of electricity from individual power 
plants can be predicted based on the marginal cost of generation over defined periods of 
electrical demand. Thus, each type of power plant on the grid can be generally viewed as 
either serving either a “base-load,” “intermediate load,” or “peak load” demand for 
electricity.   
“Base-load” refers to the minimum amount of electrical load a utility must supply 
in order to meet consumer demand. Coal, nuclear, or large hydroelectric power plants, 
which are able to produce the lowest marginal cost electricity, while also providing 
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electricity at a constant rate are typically used to supply base load power. In California a 
large portion of base-load demand is met by electricity generated from base-load 
combined cycle natural gas plants. Conversely, “Peak load” refers to periods of peak 
electrical demand, usually early afternoon when the demand of electricity to operate air 
conditioning places reaches its peak. Unlike base-load plants, which operate at a constant 
rate, peaking power plants are operated only during peak periods of electrical demand. 
Merchant power plants are generally peaking plants, which can readily supply power to 
the electrically grid, though the electricity supplied from these plants have the highest 
marginal cost within the electrical grid.   
Between periods of “base-load” and “peak load” demand are periods of 
“Intermediate load.” During periods of intermediate load, utilities typically utilize 
intermediate load power plants to meet electrical demand without having to resort to 
expensive peak load generation capacity. Intermediate load power plants also refer to 
non-dispatchable renewable sources of electricity in which the utility must utilize all 
available power. Examples of intermediate load power plants include a mixture of non-
base load natural gas plants and “must-take” renewable power plants, such as small 
hydroelectric, wind, or solar power plants. The operation of these power plants vary by 
demand type over time (hourly, daily, seasonally) and  space according to both the 
various technological and economic advantages of certain sources of electrical generation 
as well as transmission constraints, contractually relationships between utilities and 
generators, and regulatory influences.  In most cases, intermediate load resources are 
coupled with must-take “shoulder load’ (generally fossil-fuel based) generation to make 
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up for these fluctuations in load from renewable resources, and they generally operate in 
similar fashion as base-load generators (Kartha et al. 2002) (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9 
 
Generalized Utility Load Profile  
 
 
BASELINE EMISSION ESTIMATES 
Once data regarding electrical generation and consumption have been gathered, 
the next step is to develop a “baseline” emissions estimate for each utility.  The baseline 
emission estimate will be used compare emissions occurring prior to demand side 
management activities, or a “baseline scenario,” to emissions occurring after the 
implementation of each utility’s demand side management activities, or a “post-case” 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
1 1,001 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 6,001 7,001 8,001
M
W
 
 
Time of Day/Year 
 
 
Intermediate Load 
Power Plants 
(Renewables) 
Peak Load Power Plants 
“Shoulder” Load 
Power Plants 
(fossil-fuel based) 
Base Load Power Plants 
(Always On) 
65 
 
 
 
 
scenario.”  In such, estimates of avoided emissions as a result of demand side 
management activities will be inferred based on an assessment of reported electricity 
reduction as a result of these activities as well as an allocation of these savings across the 
electrical generation and purchases for each individual utility.  This study goes further by 
extrapolating the proportion of those emission reductions which can allocated to 
reduction in electric demand that can be directly tied to sources of generation located in 
Arizona.  
 Baseline emissions estimates in this study were calculated by determining the 
emissions from each individual source of electricity for each IOU based on the generation 
and electricity purchase data gathered in the previous step.  With respect to electricity 
reduction activities, these baseline emissions can be broken down into two distinct 
components – “Operating Margin” (OM) emissions,” and “Build Margin” (BM) 
emissions. Operating Margin emissions represent those emissions which result from 
electricity used to serve incremental increases in electricity demand (Beiwald 2005). As 
utility demand increases and additional generation resources are brought online, or 
additional electricity is purchased, these resources emit an emissions signature which is 
different from the total utility generation mix as a whole.  Operating Marginal emissions 
are those emissions which are most effected by demand side management activity, given 
that these activities, on a whole are generally designed to reduce peak load demand. 
Conversely, Build Margin emissions represent emissions that result from base-load 
generation which do not fluctuate according to inter-daily or inter-seasonal demand for 
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electricity.
22
  Build Marginal emission rates can also be used to represent the anticipated 
emissions resulting from additional resources coming online, though we are not 
concerned with additional resources in the scope of this study. Therefore, baseline 
emissions can be estimated by determining both the OM emission rate and the BM 
emission rate for each resource within the utility generation mix.  The equation for 
estimating the baseline emission for each utility is as follows (see Equation 3):  
 
Equation 3 
Calculating Baseline Emission Rates  
EF baseline t = wBM + (1-w) (OM)t 
Where: 
 EF baseline t  represents the baseline emission factor for each utility, (e.g. tons of 
CO2e per MWh) for time period t 
 BM represents the build margin emission factor. This variable does not vary 
over time.  
 OM represents the operating margin emission factor for time period t 
 w represents the weight between 0 and 1 assigned to the build margin, a build 
margin of “0” represents a no additional generation or no effect of the activity 
in reducing emissions.  
 
                                                          
22
 The term “build’ in build margin is an artifact of utility parlance used to describe 
additional baseline generation which would normally have been constructed to serve 
base-load demand. 
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OPERATING MARGIN ESTIMATES 
 
In theory, Operating Marginal emissions should precisely match the electrical 
generation and electricity purchases brought online during periods of high demand.  In 
practice, however, it is quite a daunting (if not impossible) task to precisely trace each 
electron from the point of generation to its ultimate consumer (ISO New England 2004). 
Instead, an OM emission rate was developed by averaging the emission rates of each 
source of electrical generation weighted according to the length of time individual 
resources operated “on the margin” during times of peak demand.  Without access to 
propriety utility data, usually in the form of hundreds of thousands of individual North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) e-tags which account for each 
electricity transaction in the utility network, the length of time that each resource 
operated was estimated through the use of “Load Duration Curve” analysis. Load 
Duration Curve (LDC) analysis assists in estimating the generation resource required to 
meet peak (marginal) system loads over the course of one year.  An LDC for each utility 
was constructed by obtaining the total grid electricity demand (load) for each hour of one 
year and then ranking the load in descending order from the highest hour of demand to 
the lowest hours of demand for each of the 8,760 hours in a year (see Figure 10).  
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Figure 10 
Generalized Utility Load Duration Curve Profile with OM and BM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After developing an LDC for each utility, the next step in determining the 
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given utility. The marginal cost of electricity is a key component of determining which 
generation unit is operated (or “dispatched”) to meet the demand for electricity at any 
given time (Conkling 1999). All things equal, the power plants with the lowest marginal 
cost of electricity production, such as coal, nuclear, or large hydroelectric plants, are 
dispatched first and therefore are located near the bottom of the loading order. Whereas 
plants with higher marginal operating costs, such as peak-load serving wholesale 
electricity purchases, and brought on line as electricity demand increases and are located 
at the top of the loading order.  Other factors that affected the loading order for each 
utility included must-take renewable energy portfolio resources and Qualified Energy 
Facilities (QEF), which tend to maximize the use of resources from these facilities 
despite their average cost. Therefore, all renewable energy and QEF purchases were 
allocated to the intermediate spectrum of the loading order.  This assisted in the 
development of a standard LDC with Loading Order for each IOU as illustrated in Figure 
11.  
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Figure 11 
Generalized Utility Load Duration Curve Profile with Loading Order 
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intersects with the operating margin (see equation 4).  Once the emission rates for each 
resource operating on the margin were calculated, the OM emission factor, for all 
resources operating “on the margin, was estimated based on a time-weighted average of 
all the emission rates (see equation 5 below).  
Equation 4 
Calculating Emission Rates for Each Generation Resources 
ERr,t  = GENr,t  x EFr 
Where:  
 ERr,t represents the total emissions for resource type r, for time period t 
 GENr,t  represents the total power generated in MWh for resource type r, over 
time period t 
 EFr,t  represents the average emission factor for resource type r, for time period t 
 
Equation 5 
Calculating Average OM Emission Rates 
OMt = ∑ (TMr,t x ERr,t) / HRSt 
Where: 
 OMt  represents the OM emission factor for time period, t 
 TMr,t  represents the number of hours that resource type r, was “on the margin” for 
time period, t.  
 ERr,t  represents the average emission factor for resource type r, for time period t.  
 HRSt  represents the total number of hours in time period t (8760) 
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BUILD MARGIN ESTIMATES 
 The procedure for calculating the BM for each base-load or new generation 
resource is similar to that used to calculate the OM emissions rate, though instead of 
calculating the total hours of the LDC in which the resource is utilized,  the only 
information needed is the total electricity generated and the emission factor for each 
individual resource.  For every base-load generation resource, the following equation is 
used to estimate the BM emissions (see equation 6).  
 
Equation 6 
Calculating Average BM Emission Rates 
BMt= ∑ (ERjt x Qjt)  
Where:  
 BMt  represents the BM emission factor for time period, t 
 ERj  represents the emission rate of resource j, over time period t 
 Qj  represents the generation (e.g. MWh) or resource j, over time period t  
 
The associated weight (w) corresponding to BM   in the initial equation represents 
the category of electricity offset by the demand side management if those activities had 
not occurred. A weight closer to “1” indicates that the displaced electricity would have 
been produced from new generation capacity, whereas a weight between “0” and “1” 
indicated that the displaced electricity would have been partially been produced by new 
generation capacity. Alternatively, a weight of “0” indicates that displaced electricity 
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would have been provided by existing generation and/or available additional wholesale 
electricity purchases.  Given that the purpose of demand side management activity is to 
displace existing resources, a weight of “0” was assigned to “w” in the initial equation.   
 
AVOIDED EMISSION ESTIMATES 
The basic approach to estimating avoided emissions as a result of  demand side 
management activity is to first assess the magnitude of the avoided generation activity for 
each utility network, then adjust these savings based on electricity transmission and 
distribution savings as a result of improved system efficiency (Meyers et al 2000). Just as 
avoided emission estimates involve complex assumptions regarding utility supply, 
estimates of electricity saving as a result of demand side management involve several 
assumptions regarding “verifiable” electricity savings.  As described in the first chapter 
of this study, utility DSM programs are coordinated efforts activities designed to reduce 
customer electricity consumption. These activities include information and educational 
campaigns, as well as “upstream” incentives designed to both lower the cost and 
increased the supply of energy efficient technology and “downstream” rebates payable to 
customers for installing specific technologies designed to reduce electricity consumption. 
There are several methods to determine electricity savings (and, in turn, associated 
avoided emissions) depending of the efficacy of the project.  
 Similar to avoided emission estimates, electricity savings are estimated by 
comparing post-case actual energy consumption with an estimated “adjusted” baseline of 
electricity consumption.  Usually the measurement and verification of electricity savings 
are estimated using standard widely accepted protocols, such as the International 
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Performance Measurement and Verification Protocol (IPMVP) (EVO 2007) or the 
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) 
Guideline 14-2 (ASHRAE  2002). Both of these protocols contain detailed methodologies 
designed to estimate electricity savings, taking into account market effects such as free-
ridership, savings about standard building codes, and the effective useful life of the 
installed electricity saving technology. Each utility is generally required to have reported 
electricity savings verified by independent third party utilizing the applicable IPMVP or 
ASHRAE guidelines, or in the case of publically owned utilities the California 
Evaluation Framework (CPUC 2006). 
 
Figure 12 
 
Electricity Savings Estimate Pre- and Post- Implementation of Demand Side 
Management Activity  
 
Source: National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (2007) 
 
Before estimating avoided emissions using these electricity savings estimates, it is 
important to take into account the associated electricity savings as a result of reduced 
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electricity use within each utility’s electrical transmission and distribution network. A 
small percentage of electrical power is lost within each utility’s network as electricity is 
transmitted and distributed due to electricity resistance, radiant heat, and other forms of 
dissipation.  This causes a small difference in the amount of electricity produced at power 
plants and electricity ultimately consumed by utility customers. In other words, 1 MWh 
of reduced electricity consumption can be translated into slightly higher than 1 MWh in 
electricity generation reduction. These transmission loss estimates must be added to 
electricity reduction estimates to account for total electricity reductions. Equation 7 
describes the method used to calculate adjusted electricity reductions for each utility: 
 
Equation 7 
 
Adjusted Avoided Electricity Reductions as a Result of Demand Side Management 
Activity accounting for Transmission and Distribution Savings 
 
GENdsm t = St / (1-L) 
Where: 
 GENdsm t  represents the total utility generation avoided by demand side 
management activity for time period t 
 S represents the total reported electricity savings for time period t 
 L represents the average percentage electricity lost due to fluctuations in 
transmission and distribution activity.  
 
These adjusted electricity savings are then used to determine the total avoided 
emissions as a result of utility DSM activity by multiplying the baseline emission factor 
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derived using the previous equations by adjusted electricity savings for each utility. The 
formula for this method can be described using the formula found in Equation 8.  
 
Equation 8:  
Estimating Avoided Emissions as a Result of DSM Activity 
EAt =  EFbaseline t x GENdsm t 
Where 
 EAt   represents that total avoided emissions over time period t 
 EFbaseline t  represents the baseline emission rate for time period t 
 GENdsm t  represents the electricity avoided, adjusted for transmission and 
distribution savings over time period t 
 
ESTIMATING AVOIDED EMISSION FROM ARIZONA BASED RESOURCES 
  The last step in this study is to quantify the amount of these avoided emissions 
which would have been generated by generators located in Arizona.  In order to 
accomplish this task, these resources disaggregated from total utility resources by each 
fuel type. For instance, electricity derived from natural gas, as well as nuclear power, or 
coal fired-based generators were considered separate resource types for the purpose of 
this study. These fuel types were considered separate resource types for the sake of 
deriving both OM and BM emission rates.  
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SUMMARY 
 This section described the methodology employed in estimating the baseline 
emission rate, and total avoided emissions for each IOU with the ultimate goal of 
determining what percentage of these emissions were derived from Arizona-based 
electricity generation resources.  The accuracy of the estimation method described lay in 
both the granularity and availability of adequate data regarding utility generations, 
purchases and consumption, as well as estimates of electricity demand side management 
savings for the 2010 through 2012 program cycle and the transmission and distribution 
loss factors for each utility.  The next section will present the data used in this study 
along with other underlying assumptions used to justify these emission estimates.  
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CHAPTER 5: ASSESSMENT DATA 
 
DATA AVAILABLITY, ACCURACY, AND UNCERTAINTY 
The most time consuming portion of this study involving gathering, accounting 
for and organizing information regarding utility generation and consumption. Though 
many of the generation resources used by each utility are widely known, accounting for 
the actual electricity used by each utility for each year within the study period proved 
extremely difficult and time consuming.  This section will describe the associated 
challenges with obtaining this data, as well as other data used in the study.  It will also 
describe levels of uncertainty associated with various pieces of data as well as data 
substitution methods employed. In such, it will identify suggested areas to improved 
future research in order to develop more accurate and dynamic estimates of avoided 
emissions resulting from utility DSM activity.   
 
IOU ELCTRICITY GENERATION AND PURCHASES 
  By far, the most tedious and time consuming activity of this research involved 
compiling, quantifying, and accounting for electricity generation and purchases for each 
IOU for each year during the study period.  While a nearly complete set of consumption, 
and generation/purchase data was compiled for 2010 for each IOU, data for 2011 and 
2012 were not available during the study period. Complicating matters further was the 
outage at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, which has been out of operation since 
January 2011 and comprises a large percentage of base-load generation for both SCE and 
SDG&E.  While it is likely that additional electricity supplied by natural gas facilities 
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was likely used as a substitute, it was impossible to determine this information with 
certainty in time for publication of this study.  In lieu of this information, and given that 
the missing information affected only the BM, and not the OM estimates which are 
ultimately tied to DSM activity, 2010 data was used as a surrogate for 2011 as well as 
2012. While this was not an optimal solution, it afforded the best opportunity to present 
reasonably quantifiable results.   
 Electricity consumption, generation, and purchases used in this study were 
compiled from several different sources, including CEC S-2: Supply Form and CEC S-5: 
Electricity Resource Planning Form. The S-2 and S-5 forms are reports each California 
utility is required to file with the CEC on a semi-annual basis. The S-2 Supply Form 
contained aggregated data by resource type, whereas the S-5 form contains information 
regarding each long-term bilateral contract between each utility and its sources of supply 
and supply type (base-load, peaking, intermediate, must-take, etc.). Additional 
information was obtained from Annual Company Filing, the U.S. DOE Energy 
Information Agency EIA-860 and EIA-861 annual operator reports, and well as other 
CPUC rate case filings.  
The information contained in these reports was then compared to original 
calculation reports submitted to the CEC under the SB1305 electricity power labeling 
requirement.  Even after these comparison, several holes in the data remained. These data 
gaps were defined as “unspecified” sources of generation within this analysis. In cases 
where the geographic point of origin could be determined, these were noted and labeled 
accordingly, California (unspecified), Desert Southwest (unspecified), and Pacific 
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Northwest (unspecified). Every effort was also made to discount electricity purchased by 
each IOU, then wheeled through the utility transmission network or resold to other third 
party entities other than its own customers. The data compiled for each IOU for 2010 are 
listed on tables 3, 4, and 5.     
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Table 3 
 
PG&E Electricity Supply for Ultimate Consumption by PG&E Customers (2010) 
 
 
  
PG&E Electricity Supply (2010 Base Year) Fuel Type Generation 
Type
Generation 
(GWh)
Utility-Owned Fossil Energy Supply 
PGE Base-load (Colusa, Gateway, Humboldt, 
Radback)
Natural Gas Base-load
3,677          
Mobile GT Fuel Oil Base-load 4                  
Utility-Owned Nuclear Energy  Supply
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Base-load 18,431        
Utility-Owned Hydroelectric Supply 
Hydroelectric plants > 30 MW Large Hydro Base-load 12,028        
Hydroelectric plants < 30 MW Large Hydro Base-load 1,268          
Utility Controlled Renewable Supply
Rooftop solar Solar Intermittent 5                  
DWR Contract* Supply
Natural Gas Natural Gas Base-load 2,640          
Natural Gas Natural Gas Peaking 1,899          
Renewable (Non-Biogenic) (Intermittent) Wind Intermittent 93                
In-state Qualifying Facility Contract Supply 
Biomass Biomass Intermittent 2,660          
Geothermal Geothermal Intermittent 5                  
Small Hydro Small Hydro Intermittent 569              
Solar Solar Intermittent -               
Wind Wind Intermittent 659              
Natural Gas Natural Gas Intermittent 9,047          
Other Unspecified Intermittent 1,707          
Direct Contract Renewable Supply 
Biomass Biomass Intermittent 598              
Geothermal Geothermal Intermittent 3,761          
Small Hydro Small Hydro Intermittent 420              
Solar Solar Intermittent 58                
Wind Wind Intermittent 3,485          
Other Unspecified Intermittent 2                  
Other Bilateral Contracts
Natural Gas Natural Gas Base-load 392              
Natural Gas Natural Gas Peaking 87                
Renewable (Non-Biogenic) Wind Intermittent 392              
Short Term and Spot Market Purchases
California (Unspecified) Unspecified Peaking 10,536        
Pacfic Northwest  (Unspecified) Unspecified Peaking 5,268          
Desert Southwest (Unspecified)** Unspecified Peaking 2,107          
Arizona Natural Gas Natural Gas Peaking 3,161          
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Table 4 
 
SCE Electricity Supply for Ultimate Consumption by SCE Customers (2010) 
 
  SCE Electricity Supply (2010 Base Year) Fuel Type Generation 
Type
Generation 
(GWh)
Utility-Owned Fossil Energy Supply 
Four Corners (New Mexico) Coal (Bitumous) Base-load 4,738              
Mountain View Natural Gas Base-load 6,052              
SCE Peakers (Barre, Center, Grape, Mira, Oxnard) Natural Gas Peaking 21                    
Utility-Owned Nuclear Energy  Supply
Palo Verde (Arizona) Nuclear Base-load 4,930              
San Onofre Nuclear Base-load 10,770            
Utility-Owned Hydroelectric Supply 
Hydroelectric plants > 30 MW Large Hydro Base-load 3,794              
Hydroelectric plants < 30 MW Large Hydro Base-load 534                  
Utility Controlled Renewable Supply
Rooftop solar Solar Intermittent -                   
DWR Contract* Supply
Natural Gas Natural Gas Base-load 12,535            
Natural Gas Natural Gas Peaking 9,016              
Renewable (Non-Biogenic) (Intermittent) Wind Intermittent 440                  
In-state Qualifying Facility Contract Supply 
Biomass Biomass Intermittent 1,107              
Geothermal Geothermal Intermittent 5,028              
Small Hydro Small Hydro Intermittent 141                  
Solar Solar Intermittent 879                  
Wind Wind Intermittent 2,291              
Natural Gas Natural Gas Intermittent 10,425            
Other Unspecified Intermittent 107                  
Direct Contract Renewable Supply 
Biomass Biomass Intermittent 146
Geothermal Geothermal Intermittent 2720
Small Hydro Small Hydro Intermittent 79
Solar Solar Intermittent 50
Wind Wind Intermittent 1733
Other Unspecified Intermittent 0
Other Bilateral Contracts
Natural Gas Natural Gas Base-load 2,408              
Natural Gas Natural Gas Peaking 1,204              
Renewable (Non-Biogenic) Hydro Intermittent 401                  
Short Term and Spot Market Purchases
California (Unspecified) Unspecified Peaking 680                  
Pacfic Northwest  (Unspecified) Unspecified Peaking 291                  
Desert Southwest (Unspecified)** Unspecified Peaking 194                  
Arizona Natural Gas Natural Gas Peaking 1,165              
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Table 5  
 
SDG&E Electricity Supply for Ultimate Consumption by SDG&E Customers (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SDG&E Electricity Supply (2010 Base Year) Fuel Type Generation 
Type
Generation 
(GWh)
Utility-Owned Fossil Energy Supply 
SDG&E Baseload (El Cajon, El Dorado, Miramar) 
Palomar)
Natural Gas Base-load
3,285         
Utility-Owned Nuclear Energy  Supply
San Onofre Nuclear Base-load 2,754         
Utility-Owned Hydroelectric Supply 
Hydroelectric plants > 30 MW Large Hydro Base-load 0
Hydroelectric plants < 30 MW Large Hydro Base-load 0
Utility Controlled Renewable Supply
Rooftop solar Solar Intermittent 3                 
DWR Contract* Supply
Natural Gas Natural Gas Base-load 2,950         
Natural Gas Natural Gas Peaking 2,122         
Renewable (Non-Biogenic) (Intermittent) Wind Intermittent 104            
In-state Qualifying Facility Contract Supply 
Biomass Biomass Intermittent 29
Geothermal Geothermal Intermittent 0
Small Hydro Small Hydro Intermittent 2
Solar Solar Intermittent 0
Wind Wind Intermittent 0
Natural Gas Natural Gas Intermittent 1,186
Other Unspecified Intermittent 0
Direct Contract Renewable Supply 
Biomass Biomass Intermittent 522
Geothermal Geothermal Intermittent 183
Small Hydro Small Hydro Intermittent 20
Solar Solar Intermittent 0
Wind Wind Intermittent 724
Other Unspecified Intermittent 0
Other Bilateral Contracts
Natural Gas Natural Gas Base-load 421            
Natural Gas Natural Gas Peaking 2,162         
Portland General Boardman (Coal) Coal Base-load 604            
Renewable (Non-Biogenic) Unspecified Intermittent -             
Short Term and Spot Market Purchases
California (Unspecified) Unspecified Peaking 130            
Pacfic Northwest  (Unspecified) Unspecified Peaking 43               
Desert Southwest (Unspecified)** Unspecified Peaking 65               
Arizona Natural Gas Natural Gas Peaking 194            
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IOU ELECTRICITY COMNSUMPTION   
 The total electricity generation and purchases ultimately consumed by associated 
customers from each IOU for 2010 calculated in using the methodology described earlier 
were as follows PG&E – 84,958 Giga-watt hours (GWh), SCE – 83,881 GWh, and 
SDG&E, 17,503 GWh.  This consumption data were compared again hourly dynamic 
load profiles. Dynamic load profiles are publically available data sources and contain 
hourly consumption information across multiple customer classes and rate structure (e.g. 
agricultural, municipal, residential, commercial, industrial, etc.). These data, when totaled 
for each IOU, came within five percent margin of error from the previously estimated 
generation and purchase data. This can be explained by transmission and distribution 
losses and losses due to utility consumption of some of the generated or purchased 
electricity. These dynamic (near-real time) hourly load data were used, in turn, to develop 
LDCs for each utility. Figure 13  illustrates “raw” untransformed, aggregate hourly load 
across all customer classes for SDG&E. Figures 14, 15, and 16 illustrate “transformed” 
LDC for SD&E, PG&E, SCE, respectively from ranked from highest hour of load to 
lowest hour of load.  
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Figure 13 
SDG&E 2010 “Untransformed” Hourly Aggregate Load (2010) 
 
Figure 14 
SDG&E 2010 “Transformed” Hourly Aggregate Load (2010) 
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Figure 15 
PG&E 2010 “Transformed” Hourly Aggregate Load (2010) 
 
Figure 16 
SCE 2010 “Transformed” Hourly Aggregate Load (2010) 
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 Once an LDC had been developed for each IOU, generation resources and 
electricity purchases were divided into nineteen combined resources categories and 
ranked from peak-load through intermediate and base-load generation based on both the 
marginal cost of generation, as well as regulatory requirements for must-take 
renewables.
23
 Marginal cost of generation data for each resource was obtained from CEC 
staff. These average marginal cost estimates are illustrated in Figure 17. These stacked 
loading orders and corresponding LDC allocation are illustrated in Table 6 and Figure 18 
(PG&E), Table 7 and Figure 19 (SCE), and Table 8 and Figure 20 (SDG&E) 
respectively. 
  
                                                          
23
 “Arizona Natural Gas estimates”  that could be directly traced to a source in Arizona 
are included in “Desert Southwest (Unspecified)” Estimates;  Natural Gas "Intermittent" 
represents natural gas plants used to firm and shape renewable electricity from QF 
contracts; Coal from SCE contracts are derived from the Four Corners Generating Station 
in New Mexico;  
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Figure 17  
 
Average Marginal Cost of Generation for California Merchant, IOU, and POU 
Generation Sources (2010 Base Year) 
 
 
Source: CEC Commission Staff (J.Klien) 
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Table 6 
“Stacked” Loading Order for PG&E  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 
 
LDC corresponding to Stacked Loading Order for PG&E  
  
Fuel Type Generation Type GWh
AZ Natural Gas Peaking 3,161             
Desert Southwest (Unspecified) Peaking 2,107             
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) Peaking 5,268             
California (Unspecified) Peaking 10,536           
Natural Gas Peaking 1,986             
Biomass Intermittent 3,258             
Natural Gas Intermittent 9,047             
Geothermal Intermittent 3,766             
Solar Intermittent 63                   
Wind Intermittent 4,629             
Small Hydro Intermittent 989                
Large Hydroelectric Intermittent 13,296           
California (Unspecified) Intermittent 1,709             
AZ Coal Base-load -                 
AZ Nuclear Base-load -                 
Natural Gas Base-load 6,709             
Coal Base-load -                 
Fuel Oil Base-load 4                     
Nuclear Base-load 18,431           
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Table 7 
“Stacked” Loading Order for SCE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 
LDC corresponding to Stacked Loading Order for SCE  
 
Fuel Type Generation Type GWh
AZ Natural Gas Peaking 1,165     
Desert Southwest (Unspecified) Peaking 194        
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) Peaking 291        
California (Unspecified) Peaking 680        
Natural Gas Peaking 10,242   
Biomass Intermittent 1,253     
Natural Gas Intermittent 10,425   
Geothermal Intermittent 7,748     
Solar Intermittent 929        
Wind Intermittent 4,464     
Small Hydro Intermittent 220        
Large Hydroelectric Intermittent 4,729     
California (Unspecified) Intermittent 107        
AZ Coal Base-load -         
AZ Nuclear Base-load 4,930     
Natural Gas Base-load 20,995   
Coal Base-load 4,738     
Fuel Oil Base-load -         
Nuclear Base-load 10,770   
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Table 8 
“Stacked” Loading Order for SDG&E  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 
LDC corresponding to Stacked Loading Order for SDG&E  
Fuel Type Generation Type GWh
AZ Natural Gas Peaking 194        
Desert Southwest (Unspecified) Peaking 65           
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) Peaking 43           
California (Unspecified) Peaking 130        
Natural Gas Peaking 4,284     
Biomass Intermittent 551        
Natural Gas Intermittent 1,186     
Geothermal Intermittent 183        
Solar Intermittent 3             
Wind Intermittent 828        
Small Hydro Intermittent 22           
Large Hydroelectric Intermittent -         
California (Unspecified) Intermittent -         
AZ Coal Base-load -         
AZ Nuclear Base-load -         
Natural Gas Base-load 6,656     
Coal Base-load 604        
Fuel Oil Base-load -         
Nuclear Base-load 2,754     
92 
 
 
 
 
EMISSION FACTORS 
Once the utility generation and purchases (supply) have been matched to utility 
demand along the LDC, the next step in the process is to calculate the emissions for each 
resource type.  Average emission factors for each fuel type were derived from data 
contained in Appendix B of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Climate 
Leaders Program for Stationary Combustion Sources (EPA 2008). Emission factors for 
unspecified sources of electricity were derived based on average regional emission 
factors for the EPA Arizona- New Mexico Region (Desert Southwest (Unspecified)), 
California Region (California (Unspecified)), and Pacific Northwest (Pacific Northwest 
(Unspecified). This data was provided in the form of kilograms of CO2e per MMBTU 
(see Table 7). This data was converted to kilograms of CO2e per MWh by using the 
conversion factor one MMBtu equates to 0.29307107017222 MWh (see Table 8).    
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Table 9 
Average Emission Factors by Fuel Type/ Region (MMBtu) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10  
Average Emission Factors by Fuel Type/ Region (MWh) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fuel Type kg CO2/MMBtu kg CH4/MMBtu kg N2O/MMBtu kg CO2e /MMBtu
Natural Gas 53.0567 0.0052709 0.0001054 53.200036
Fuel Oil (No. 2) 73.15 0.010542 0.000633 73.567457
Biomass 93.8667 0.316256 0.004217 101.815222
Propane 63.0667 0.010542 0.000633 63.484124
Liquid Propane 63.162 0.010542 0.000633 63.579457
Kerosene 72.3067 0.010542 0.000633 72.724124
Fuel Oil (No. 1) 73.15 0.010542 0.000633 73.567457
Fuel Oil (No. 5 & No. 6) 78.7967 0.010542 0.000633 79.214124
Coal (anthracite) 103.62 0.010542 0.001581 104.331575
Coal (bituminous) 93.4633 0.010542 0.001581 94.174908
Coke 113.6667 0.010542 0.001581 114.378242
Fuel Oil (No. 4) 73.15 0.010542 0.000633 73.567457
Diesel 73.15 0.010542 0.000633 73.567457
Desert Southwest (Unspecified) 166.52 0.002500 0.002200 167.250900
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) 114.16 0.002200 0.001800 114.770900
California (Unspecified) 90.53 0.003800 0.000800 90.865300
Fuel Type kg CO2/MWh kg CH4/MWh kg N2O/MWh kg CO2e /MWh
Natural Gas 15.550029       0.001545         0.000031          15.592039          
Fuel Oil (No. 2) 21.439039       0.003090         0.000185          21.561388          
Biomass 27.510756       0.092689         0.001236          29.840335          
Propane 18.483792       0.003090         0.000185          18.606132          
Liquid Propane 18.511723       0.003090         0.000185          18.634073          
Kerosene 21.191882       0.003090         0.000185          21.314222          
Fuel Oil (No. 1) 21.439039       0.003090         0.000185          21.561388          
Fuel Oil (No. 5 & No. 6) 23.093992       0.003090         0.000185          23.216332          
Coal (anthracite) 30.369285       0.003090         0.000463          30.577836          
Coal (bituminous) 27.392526       0.003090         0.000463          27.601087          
Coke 33.313804       0.003090         0.000463          33.522345          
Fuel Oil (No. 4) 21.439039       0.003090         0.000185          21.561388          
Diesel 21.439039       0.003090         0.000185          21.561388          
Desert Southwest (Unspecified) 48.804220       0.000733         0.000645          49.018435          
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) 33.458382       0.000645         0.000528          33.637427          
California (Unspecified) 26.532825       0.001114         0.000234          26.631096          
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DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT ELECTRICITY SAVINGS 
 
 Individual utility estimates of gross reported monthly through the California 
Energy Commission Energy Efficiency Groupware Application (CEC 2013).  A complete 
set of demand side management electricity savings data for each month of the program 
cycle was made available for the entire 2010-2012 program cycle through this application 
groupware.  This data was aggregated for each utility across the program cycle and 
averaged across each year in the program. Given that only one baseline year (2010) was 
used in this study, it was important to normalize the data for one year. Based on this 
information, emission estimates will be averaged across all program years. It is also 
important to note that this raw data has yet to be evaluated, measured, or verified 
(EM&V) using the appropriate EM&V protocol such as IPMVP, ASHRAE, or CEF.  
 
Table 11 
 
California IOU DSM Electricity Savings Estimates (gross GWh)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2010-2012  
Cumulative 
Average Annual 
DSM Savings 
(2010-2012) 
2010-2012  
Cumulative 
Average Annual 
DSM Savings 
(2010-2012) 
2010-2012  
Cumulative 
Average Annual 
DSM Savings 
(2010-2012) 
Gross Annual Energy 
Savings (GWh)             5,420.21              1,806.74                 4,078.50                1,359.50                892.74                  297.58 
Aggregate Peak 
Demand Reduction 
(MW)                 986.36                  328.79                    773.92                   257.97                153.31                     51.10 
 PG&E  SCE  SDG&E 
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IOU TRANSMISISON AND LOSS FACTORS 
 
 An estimate of transmission and distribution (T&D) electricity savings were 
derived by using the inverse transmission and load loss factors for each IOU based on 
CEC estimates (Wong 2011).  While these T&D loss generally comprise a small portion 
of the total electricity ultimately consumed, they can significantly affect emissions 
estimates. Based on a range of T&D load loss estimates, the CEC peak demand load loss 
forecast estimates were used as a conservative approximation of the modify employed to 
derive anticipated T&D electricity savings as a result of demand side management 
activity. The T&D savings multipliers were used to adjust the gross electricity savings 
estimates as a result of demand side management activity through the program cycle 
(Table 12).    
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Table 12 
 
California IOU DSM Electricity Savings Estimates (gross GWh, adjusted for T&D 
savings)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wong 2011  
 
  
Average 
Annualized DSM 
Savings (2010-
2012) (MWh)
Transmission/ 
Distribustion Load Loss 
(Savings) Factor 
Adjusted Average 
Annualized DSM 
Savings (2010-
2012) (MWh)
Gross Annual 
Electricity 
Consumption (GWh)             1,806.74 0.096 1,998.60               
Aggregate Annual 
Electric Load (MW)                      329  NA 
Average 
Annualized DSM 
Savings (2010-
2012) (MWh)
Transmission/ 
Distribustion Load Loss 
(Savings) Factor 
Adjusted Average 
Annualized DSM 
Savings (2010-
2012) (MWh)
Gross Annual 
Electricity 
Consumption (GWh)             1,359.50                                 0.068 1,458.69               
Aggregate Annual 
Electric Load (MW)                      258  NA 
Average 
Annualized DSM 
Savings (2010-
2012) (MWh)
Transmission/ 
Distribustion Load Loss 
(Savings) Factor 
Adjusted Average 
Annualized DSM 
Savings (2010-
2012) (MWh)
Gross Annual 
Electricity 
Consumption (GWh)                 297.58 0.071 320.32                   
Aggregate Annual 
Electric Load (MW)                         51 NA
 PG&E 
 SCE 
 SDG&E 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
BASELINE EMISSION ESTIMATES 
 Based on the information derived in the preceding sections, several emission 
estimates were derived for each IOU based on the available information using 2010 base 
year electricity consumption and generation/purchase data.  These data were then used to 
extrapolate emissions estimates across all program years for each IOU.  The first set of 
emissions estimated were total baseline emissions for each IOU by resource types using 
the generation by resource type and associated emission factors for each corresponding 
fuel type. The emission estimates for each fuel types were then aggregated to develop a 
baseline estimate of total baseline emissions for each IOU (Tables 13, 14, and 15).  
 
Table 13  
PG&E Total Baseline Emissions by Resource Type (2010 Base Year) 
 
 
 
 
  
Fuel Type Generation Type  GWh Emission Factor  
(kg CO2e /MWh)
Emissions                
(kg CO2e) 
Emissions            
(MT CO2e)
AZ Natural Gas Peaking 3,161             15.55002931 49,150,532.64         49,150.53        
Desert Southwest (Unspecified) Peaking 2,107             48.8042204 102,840,253.22      102,840.25      
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) Peaking 5,268             33.45838218 176,258,757.33      176,258.76      
California (Unspecified) Peaking 10,536           266.3109613 2,805,852,288.39   2,805,852.29   
Natural Gas Peaking 1,986             15.55002931 30,879,403.70         30,879.40        
Biomass Intermittent 3,258             298.403347 972,198,104.56      972,198.10      
Natural Gas Intermittent 9,047             15.55002931 140,681,115.15      140,681.12      
Geothermal Intermittent 3,766             0 -                             -                     
Solar Intermittent 63                   0 -                             -                     
Wind Intermittent 4,629             0 -                             -                     
Small Hydro Intermittent 989                0 -                             -                     
Large Hydroelectric Intermittent 13,296           0 -                             -                     
California (Unspecified) Intermittent 1,709             26.53282532 45,344,598.48         45,344.60        
AZ Coal Base-load -                 27.39252638 -                             -                     
AZ Nuclear Base-load -                 0 -                             -                     
Natural Gas Base-load 6,709             15.55002931 104,319,237.62      104,319.24      
Coal (Bitumous) Base-load -                 27.39252638 -                             -                     
Fuel Oil Base-load 4                     21.43903869 85,756.15                 85.76                
Nuclear Base-load 18,431           0 -                             -                     
Total 4,427,610,047.25  4,427,610.05  
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Table 14 
SCE Total Baseline Emissions by Resource Type (2010 Base Year)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 
SDG&E Total Baseline Emissions by Resource Type (2010 Base Year)  
Fuel Type Generation Type  GWh Emission Factor  
(kg CO2e /MWh)
Emissions            (kg 
CO2e) 
Emissions            
(MT CO2e)
AZ Natural Gas Peaking 1,165     15.55002931 18,118,894.15         18,118.89        
Desert Southwest (Unspecified)* Peaking 194        48.8042204 9,477,779.60           9,477.78           
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) Peaking 291        33.45838218 9,746,426.73           9,746.43           
California (Unspecified) Peaking 680        266.3109613 181,091,453.69      181,091.45      
Natural Gas Peaking 10,242   15.55002931 159,255,780.66      159,255.78      
Biomass Intermittent 1,253     298.403347 373,899,393.80      373,899.39      
Natural Gas Intermittent 10,425   15.55002931 162,109,055.54      162,109.06      
Geothermal Intermittent 7,748     0 -                             -                     
Solar Intermittent 929        0 -                             -                     
Wind Intermittent 4,464     0 -                             -                     
Small Hydro Intermittent 220        0 -                             -                     
Large Hydroelectric Intermittent 4,729     0 -                             -                     
California (Unspecified) Intermittent 107        26.53282532 2,839,012.31           2,839.01           
AZ Coal Base-load -         27.39252638 -                             -                     
AZ Nuclear Base-load 4,930     0 -                             -                     
Natural Gas Base-load 20,995   15.55002931 326,477,063.84      326,477.06      
Coal (Bitumous) Base-load 4,738     27.39252638 129,785,789.98      129,785.79      
Fuel Oil Base-load -         21.43903869 -                             -                     
Nuclear Base-load 10,770   0 -                             -                     
Total 83,881  1,372,800,650.30  1,372,800.65  
Fuel Type Generation Type  GWh Emission Factor     
(kg CO2e /MWh)
Emissions                      
(kg CO2e) 
Emissions            
(MT CO2e)
AZ Natural Gas Peaking 194     15.55002931 3,016,705.69      3,016.71       
Desert Southwest (Unspecified)* Peaking 65       48.8042204 3,172,274.33      3,172.27       
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) Peaking 43       33.45838218 1,438,710.43      1,438.71       
California (Unspecified) Peaking 130     266.3109613 34,620,424.97    34,620.42     
Natural Gas Peaking 4,284 15.55002931 66,618,813.56    66,618.81     
Biomass Intermittent 551     298.403347 164,420,244.20  164,420.24   
Natural Gas Intermittent 1,186 15.55002931 18,442,334.76    18,442.33     
Geothermal Intermittent 183     0 -                        -                 
Solar Intermittent 3         0 -                        -                 
Wind Intermittent 828     0 -                        -                 
Small Hydro Intermittent 22       0 -                        -                 
Large Hydroelectric Intermittent -      0 -                        -                 
California (Unspecified) Intermittent -      26.53282532 -                        -                 
AZ Coal Base-load -      27.39252638 -                        -                 
AZ Nuclear Base-load -      0 -                        -                 
Natural Gas Base-load 6,656 15.55002931 103,505,971.09  103,505.97   
Coal (Bitumous) Base-load 604     27.39252638 16,545,085.93    16,545.09     
Fuel Oil Base-load -      21.43903869 -                        -                 
Nuclear Base-load 2,754 0 -                        -                 
Total 411,780,564.96  411,780.56  
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OPERATING MARGIN EMISSION ESTIMATES 
 
 Once the baseline emission rate for each resource for each IOU had been 
calculated, the next step was to estimate margin emission rates from which avoided 
emissions resulting from IOU DSM activity would be derived. These estimates were 
derived by calculating the percent of time in terms of load hours in which each given 
marginal resource intersected with the LDC curve. Using integral analysis defined in the 
methodology, the number of hours that each resource was “on the margin” was calculated 
to determine the percentage of time in which that resources would be considered the most 
prominent load following resource before the next highest cost of generation would have 
to be put online. The operating marginal emission rate for each fuel type was then used to 
derive an average total and hourly Operating Margin emission rate for each IOU (see 
Tables 16 through 18).  
 
Table 16 
PG&E Operating Margin Emissions by Resource Type (2010 Base Year) 
 
 
 
 
Fuel Type Number of Hours 
when resource is 
"on the margin"
Percent of LDC/ 
when resource is 
"on the margin" 
Emission Factor Operating Margin 
Emissions (kg 
CO2e/MWh)
AZ Natural Gas 1,023                       14.66% 15.55 15,907,679.98              
Desert Southwest (Unspecified) 3,658                       52.41% 48.80 178,525,838.22           
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) 2,164                       31.00% 33.46 72,403,939.04              
California (Unspecified) 105                          1.50% 26.53 2,785,946.66                
Natural Gas 30                             0.43% 15.55 466,500.88                   
Total Operating Margin Emission factor 270,089,904.78           
Hourly Operating Marginal Emission Factor (/8760) 30,832.18                     
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Table 17 
 
SCE Operating Margin Emissions by Resource Type (2010 Base Year)  
 
 
 
 
Table 18 
 
SDG&E Operating Margin Emissions by Resource Type (2010 Base Year)  
 
 
 
 
AVOIDED EMISSION ESTIMATES  
 
 Using baseline and operating margin emissions estimates, as well as electricity 
reduction estimates adjusted for transmission and distribution savings, then normalized 
for all program years (2010-2012), the total avoided emissions resulting from DSM 
activity for each individual IOU and aggregated across all IOUs were derived. The 
Fuel Type Number of Hours 
when resource is 
"on the margin"
Percent of LDC/ 
when resource is 
"on the margin" 
Emission Factor Operating Margin 
Emissions (kg 
CO2e/MWh)
AZ Natural Gas 879                           10.03% 15.55 13,668,475.76                
Desert Southwest (Unspecified) 196                           2.24% 48.80 9,565,627.20                  
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) 528                           6.03% 33.46 17,666,025.79                
California (Unspecified) 2,954                       33.72% 26.53 78,377,966.00                
Natural Gas 4,203                       47.98% 15.55 65,356,773.18                
Total Operating Margin Emission factor 184,634,867.94             
Hourly Operating Marginal Emission Factor (/8760) 21,077.04                       
Fuel Type Number of Hours 
when resource is 
"on the margin"
Percent of LDC/ 
when resource is 
"on the margin" 
Emission Factor Operating Margin 
Emissions (kg 
CO2e/MWh)
AZ Natural Gas 789                         9.01% 15.55 12,268,973.12                
Desert Southwest (Unspecified) 126                         1.44% 48.80 6,149,331.77                  
Pacific Northwest (Unspecified) 112                         1.28% 33.46 3,747,338.80                  
California (Unspecified) 3,030                      34.59% 26.53 80,394,460.73                
Natural Gas 4,703                      53.69% 15.55 73,131,787.84                
Total Operating Margin Emission factor 175,691,892.26             
Hourly Operating Marginal Emission Factor (/8760) 20,056.15                       
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resulting avoided emissions estimated as a result of IOU demand side management 
activity is displayed in Table 19.  
Table 19 
 
Total Emission Reductions by IOU (2010-2012 DSM Program Cycle)  
 
 
 
AVOIDED EMISSION ESTIMATES FROM ARIZONA BASED RESOURCES 
 
  Finally, the total avoided emissions from Arizona based resources were derived 
by using the percent operating margin for Arizona based resources operating on the 
margin. In this case, the only Arizona based marginal resources generally subject to peak 
load demand reduction were Arizona-based natural gas resources. This was expected 
given these resources generally have the highest marginal cost of generation. 
Additionally other Arizona based resources, such as Arizona nuclear produce no GHG 
emissions and Arizona-based coal is subject to base load (build-margin) marginal 
emission rates and would generally not be subject to reductions in peak load demand.  
It is important to note that these estimates of Arizona-based GHG reductions are a 
conservative estimate of total reduction, given that a portion of each IOUs electricity 
imports from the Desert Southwest could not be specifically traced to Arizona resources, 
due to a lack of significantly granular data (Table 20).  If even fifty percent of the total 
Average Annualized 
DSM Savings (2010-
2012) (GWh)
Transmission/ 
Distribustion Load 
Loss Factor 
Adjusted Average 
Annualized DSM 
Savings (2010-
2012) (MWh)
Operating Margin 
Emissions (kg 
CO2e/MWh)
Average Annualized 
Emission Reductions 
as a Result of DSM 
Activity (kg CO2e)
Program Cycle (2010-
2012) Emission Reductions 
Resulting from DSM 
Activity (MT CO2e)
PG&E                       1,806.74 0.096 1,998.60                30,832.18            61,621,274.08        184,863.82                          
SCE                       1,359.50                        0.068 1,458.69                21,077.04            30,744,887.87        92,234.66                            
SDG&E                           297.58 0.071 320.32                   20,056.15            6,424,445.36           19,273.34                            
Total Emission Reduction As a Result of DSM Activity 296,371.82                         
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electricity imports from the Desert Southwest were added to the estimate it could 
significantly increase these estimates.  An interesting facet of this analysis is that avoided 
emissions from Arizona based resources comprise a slighter higher than average total of 
other sources of avoided emissions in PG&E and SDG&E’s service territories. This could 
be explained by variations in each utility’s fuel mix, though it can likely be best 
explained by the fact that Arizona resources, specifically natural gas do not operate as 
long as a marginal (“on the margin”) resource in these service territories.  
 
Table 20  
 
Total Emission Reduction from Arizona Resources (Conservative Estimate) as a Result 
of California IOU DSM 2010-2012 Program Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21 
 
Percent Total Emissions Avoided as a Result of 2010-2012 IOU DSM Program Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Program Cycle Total 
Emissions (2010-2012 
Cycle)  (MT CO2e/MWh)
Program Cycle (2010-
2012) DSM Avoided 
Emissions  (MT CO2e)
Percent  
Emissions 
Avoided
PG&E 13,282,830.14                184,863.82                      1.39%
SCE 4,118,401.95                   92,234.66                         2.24%
SDG&E 1,235,341.69                   19,273.34                         1.56%
Total 18,636,573.79                296,371.82                      1.59%
Total Arizona NG 
Operating Margin 
Emissions (MT 
CO2e/MWh)
Estimated Percent  
Emissions Avoided 
(Conservative) 
Net Reduction in 
Emissions (2010-2012) 
(MT CO2e/MWh)
PG&E 47,723.04             6.00% 2,862.43                         
SCE 41,005.43             3.53% 1,448.27                         
SDG&E 36,806.92             2.76% 1,016.42                         
Total 5,327.12                        
Percent of Total DSM Emission Reductions (2010-2012) 1.7974%
Percent of Total Emissions (2010-2012) 0.0286%
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Based on the method described in the previous sections, the answer to the 
research question: “What is the quantity of GHG emission reductions (in terms of CO2e) 
that can be attributed to reduced electricity demand from Arizona-based electricity 
resources as a result of CPUC mandated and rate-payer funded IOU (PG&E, SCE, and 
SDG&E) DSM activities from 2010 through 2012?,” is 5,372 metric tons CO2e,   or 
approximately 1.8 percent of total avoided emissions can be directly linked to demand 
reduction for Arizona based generation resources.   
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
The immediate policy implications of this research are in assisting both state 
agencies and utilities in developing credible, accurate, and defensible assessments of 
avoided emissions estimates. This is extremely relevant given the recently launched “Cap 
and Trade” program in California.  In the future, utilities will receive credits based upon 
reducing their associated GHG emissions below baseline levels set by CARB.  Within the 
cap and trade scheme utility generation is reported and credited separately from those 
retail electric operators. While this provides an incentive for utilities to both reduce 
electric demand and increase purchases from renewable electric generation sources, it 
also places significantly more importance of the GHG emissions derived from marginal 
operating sources, such as Arizona-based natural gas despite the added expense of this 
generation.   
Conversely, it is an important tool for Arizona-based operators to use to 
understand the potential financial implications of the California emissions market as well 
as reductions in absolute demand from these resources over time. In the broader context 
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of the western electric grid, it serves to further define the market power of GHG emission 
reductions in the broader context of electricity imports between and among markets. 
More importantly, through this analysis regarding the spatial context of GHG emission 
reductions, this study hopes to shed light on the spill-over effect of environmental 
regulation between states with connected electricity systems, as well as serve as a 
foundation for future academic inquiry into effective strategies to track, monitor, and 
model avoided emissions from grid-based utility resources.  These improved methods 
will provide state agencies with objective tools to analyze the long-term implications of 
GHG mitigation strategies as they are applied to the electric generation sector.  
   
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Needless to say, there are significant opportunities to improve this model through 
the use of more granular data.  The most obvious improvement in this regard is to gather 
additional primary data regarding electrical generation and purchases, the most granular 
of which are based on North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) e-tags 
for hourly purchases, though would require sorting and analyzing likely hundreds of 
thousands of electricity transactions for each IOU across multiple generation types. 
Though not impossible given that utilities manage and track these data, utilities are not 
likely to share this information upon request.  
In a similar fashion, the model could be significantly improved through the use of 
an actual loading order for each IOU or, at the very least, improved data regarding the 
marginal cost of generation for each resource. While utilities are, again, unlikely to share 
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the exact loading order of their generation resources or the marginal cost of generation, 
more precise loading orders could be determined for each utility based on their own 
unique generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption profiles. This would also 
provide improved understanding of each utility’s transmission and distribution load loss 
profile with respect the spatial context of each marginal resource within its electricity mix 
(e.g. are peak load plants subject to additional load losses given that these resources are 
located the furthest away from the point of consumption? Or vice versa?).  
Finally, the study provides a better understanding of how the load duration curve 
is affected by electricity reduction as a result of demand side management activity and all 
demand side management activity was considered as being equal.  It would be interesting 
to estimate how the load duration curve would be affected by changes in load in only 
portions of a utility service territory, and in turn, how this would affect the marginal 
emission rate.  Further analysis could even be conducted by disaggregating consumption 
and demand reduction by customer class to derive separate load duration curves. These in 
turn could be matched individually according the estimated hourly generation resources 
by customer type to derive even more granular data regarding the impact of demand side 
management and the emission rate form those specific consumption activities.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 While the primary objective of this research involved quantifying GHG 
emissions, the research itself lends itself to many other environmental aspects of utility 
resource planning aside from emissions themselves. The same techniques employed in 
this study can also be used to measure the effect of other forms of environmental impacts 
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and/or remediation efforts involving grid-based electricity resources.  For instance, one 
could apply the same techniques used in this study to determine the effect of demand side 
management activities in reducing the use of fresh water for cooling generation.  On a 
micro-level these same techniques can be applied to target demand side management 
activities within particular areas within a service territory where a mixture of 
cogeneration, peak load demand shift, and renewable techniques can be used to plan and 
develop corridors of sustainable electricity development within a given utility service 
territory. In essence, the efficacy of this research is in how it is applied to other aspects of 
utility supply and demand side planning to promote cleaner, more efficient electricity 
production and consumption.    
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